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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AS INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKERS 
LILLIAN APONTE MIRANDA* 
ABSTRACT 
Through a transnational social movement that has capitalized 
upon the politics of difference, local communities of indigenous 
peoples have significantly participated in the construction of a 
distinctive international legal identity and derivative framework of 
human rights.  The ability of a traditionally marginalized 
community to succeed in strategically facilitating the recognition of 
an international legal identity and substantive reconstitution of 
human rights precepts is a unique phenomenon that merits 
attention.  To that end, this Article addresses the role of indigenous 
peoples in international human rights lawmaking.  It argues that 
indigenous peoples have played a significant role in changing the 
legal landscape of human rights in ways that are not necessarily 
captured by mainstream accounts of non-state actor participation 
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in international norm-building and decision-making.  It further 
proposes, however, that the participation of indigenous peoples in 
international human rights lawmaking continues to operate within 
certain discursive and structural limitations.  While indigenous 
peoples’ participation may serve to lend greater legitimacy to 
international human rights law and lawmaking processes, such 
participation may not effectively deliver material gains.  As a 
result, continued advocacy on behalf of indigenous peoples must 
acknowledge and respond to these challenges. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Today, indigenous peoples have a presence in the halls of the 
United Nations and the Organization of American States.  Victoria 
Tauli-Corpuz, a member of the Igorot community from the 
Philippines and Chairperson of the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, walks the halls of the United Nations 
headquarters in New York on her way to an annual session of the 
Permanent Forum.1  Carrie Dann, a member of the Western 
Shoshone Tribe, appears with her attorney, Julie Fischel, and other 
members from the Western Shoshone delegation before the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Geneva.2  
Hugo Jabini, a member of the Association of Saramaka Authorities 
and its Paramaribo representative, sits before the Inter-American 
Commission and provides testimony regarding the Saramaka 
 
1 See Biography of Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON 
INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/member 
_tauli.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (providing detailed information on 
Chairperson Tauli-Corpuz).  The other members of the Permanent Forum 
nominated by indigenous peoples include: Lars Anders-Baer, a member of the 
Saami community from Sweden; Hassan Id Balkassm, an Amazigh member from 
Morocco; Mick Dodson, a Yawuru member from Australia; Margaret Lokawua, a 
Karimjong member from Uganda; Elisa Canqui Mollo, an Aymara member from 
Bolivia; Pavel Sulyandziga, an Udege member from the Russian Federation; and 
Tonya Gonnella Frichner, an “Onondaga Nation, Six Nations Iroquois 
Confederacy Haudenosaunee” member from the United States.  Members of the 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigneous Issues, U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON 
INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/members.html 
#members_08-10 (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
2 See Western Shoshone, THE UNIV. OF ARIZ. JAMES E. ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LAW AND POLICY PROGRAM, http://www.law.arizona.edu 
/depts/iplp/advocacy/shoshone/index.cfm?page=advoc (last visited Oct. 30, 
2010) (discussing the advocacy efforts of Mary and Carrie Dann, two Western 
Shoshone grandmothers, before international human rights bodies). 
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people’s efforts to protect their lands and resources from mining 
and logging companies.3 
*** 
Over the past forty years, indigenous peoples have played an 
increasing role in global governance, particularly in processes of 
international lawmaking.4  Through a transnational social 
movement that has capitalized upon the politics of difference, 
indigenous peoples have participated significantly in the 
construction of a distinctive international, legal identity and 
derivative framework of human rights.5  The ability of a 
traditionally marginalized community to succeed in strategically 
facilitating the recognition of an international legal identity and 
substantive reconstitution of human rights precepts is a unique 
phenomenon that merits attention. 
There is a continuously evolving stream of international law 
literature that contests the orthodox taxonomy of international 
lawmaking as exclusively statist or state-centered and 
acknowledges the varying participatory roles of non-state actors.6  
However, this literature does not address indigenous peoples’ 
participation in the creation of a distinctive international legal 
identity and derivative framework of human rights.7  For 
 
3 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶64 (Nov. 28, 2007) 
(noting that Hugo Jabini testified regarding “the Saramaka people’s efforts to 
protect their land and resources, their alleged attempts to settle the case with the 
State, and their methods for documenting traditional Saramaka use of the 
territory”). 
4 See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
56–72 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing indigenous peoples’ increasing representation, 
status, and rights at the international scale). 
5 See infra Part 3 (discussing indigenous peoples’ participation in 
international lawmaking).  This Article does not focus on the classic concept of 
“indigenousness,” which is “ultimately based on Eurocentric notions of cultural 
hierarchy, according to which ‘indigenous peoples’ occupied the lower stages on a 
single scale of ‘civilization.’”  For an analysis of the classic concept of 
“indigenous,” see LUIS RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME (1919–1989) 338–41 (2005).  Rather, this 
Article is concerned with the contemporary legal construction of indigenous 
peoples, “denoting culturally distinct groups within the political framework of 
independent states.”  Id. at 338; see also ANAYA, supra note 4, at 57–58 (describing 
conferences through which indigenous peoples have contributed to the 
formulation of a transnational identity and which have led indigenous peoples to 
coordinate their contemporary demands). 
6 See infra Part 2.1. 
7 See infra Part 2.2. 
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indigenous peoples, participation in international human rights 
lawmaking is a means to the realization of claims that require the 
restructuring of power relationships among states, non-state actors, 
and local communities.8  Specifically, such participation is part of a 
strategy aimed at shifting the balance of power in contested 
domestic, political struggles stemming from claims to increased 
protection of cultural practices, greater control over ancestral lands 
and resources, and ultimately, the meaningful exercise of self-
determination.9 
Accordingly, this Article focuses on the participation of 
indigenous peoples in international human rights lawmaking and 
seeks to answer the following questions: (1) What circumstances 
have facilitated indigenous peoples’ participation in international 
human rights lawmaking?  (2) Through what processes have 
indigenous peoples participated in international human rights 
lawmaking?  (3) How have indigenous peoples contributed to the 
indigenous peoples’ category and to a derivative framework of 
human rights?  (4) What are the implications of such participation, 
not only with respect to the constitution of international law, but 
also with respect to the continued advancement of indigenous 
peoples’ claims?  Ultimately, does indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international human rights lawmaking reveal a 
space of contestation that could lead to the use of international 
human rights law as a means of social transformation for 
indigenous peoples?  What are the possibilities?  What are the 
challenges? 
To that end, Part 2 examines existing literature regarding the 
role of non-state actors in international lawmaking as a means of 
 
8 See Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the Contemporary 
Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure Systems and International 
Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin 
America, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 419, 421–22 (2008) (suggesting that indigenous 
peoples have strategically engaged in human rights litigation at the international 
level with respect to claims of ownership, occupancy, use, and control of ancestral 
lands as a means of challenging domestic law). 
9 See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The Maya Petition to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights: Indigenous Land and Resource Rights and the Conflict over Logging 
and Oil in Southern Belize, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS 180-85 (Isfahan Merali & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001) (suggesting that 
the Maya’s pursuit of international recourse against the state of Belize for granting 
logging and oil exploration concessions to multinational corporations on the 
Maya’s traditional lands constituted an “attempt[] to use the sphere of 
international human rights law to . . . shift the balance of power and terms of 
debate in their favor”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/4
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contextualizing an account of indigenous peoples’ participation in 
human rights lawmaking.  Part 3 analyzes the informal and formal 
norm-building and decision-making processes utilized by 
indigenous peoples to participate in transnational identity building 
and the substantive reconstitution of international human rights 
law.  Part 4 evaluates the implications of indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international human rights lawmaking from two 
distinct vantage points: (1) the constitution of international human 
rights law, and (2) the continued advancement of indigenous 
peoples’ claims. 
Ultimately, this Article argues that indigenous peoples have 
played a significant role in changing the legal landscape of human 
rights in ways that are not necessarily captured by mainstream 
accounts of non-state actor participation in international norm-
building and decision-making.  Indigenous peoples have 
employed a multi-layered approach to international human rights 
lawmaking that includes participation in both informal 
mechanisms of knowledge production and norm-generation as 
well as more formal decision-making structures.  Indigenous 
peoples have forever changed the landscape of human rights 
through their participatory efforts by contributing to the 
recognition of a distinctive indigenous peoples category and 
derivative framework of human rights.  However, this Article 
further proposes that the participation of indigenous peoples in 
international human rights lawmaking continues to operate within 
certain discursive and structural limitations.  While indigenous 
peoples’ participation may serve to lend greater legitimacy to 
international human rights law and lawmaking processes, such 
participation may not serve to effectively deliver material gains.  
As a result, continued advocacy on behalf of indigenous peoples 
must acknowledge and respond to these challenges. 
2. ACCOUNTING FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ PARTICIPATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 
There are two primary streams of literature pertaining to 
indigenous peoples’ participation in international lawmaking.10  
 
10 As referred to in this Article, international lawmaking involves 
international processes of norm-building and decision-making aimed at 
determining the content of international law.  There has been a recognition that, 
broadly conceived, international processes of norm-building and decision-making 
may result in the production of both “hard” and “soft” international law.  See 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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One stream addresses non-state actor participation in international 
lawmaking.11  While this literature includes some passing 
references to the participatory role of indigenous peoples, it does 
not provide a discrete narrative of indigenous peoples’ role in 
 
Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 
319–23 (2006) (discussing the “dynamic interplay” between “hard law” and “soft 
law”). 
11 See generally Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing 
Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. 
WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980) (conceiving of international lawmaking as a process 
of authoritative and controlling decision-making within the global community 
that includes the participation of non-state actors); W. Michael Reisman et al., The 
New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575 (2007) (providing an 
overview of the New Haven school of thought); see also José Alvarez, Governing the 
World: International Organizations as Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 591, 
591 (2008) [hereinafter Alvarez, Governing the World] (discussing the role of 
international organizations in international lawmaking); José Alvarez, 
International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324, 324 (2006) 
(discussing how the evolution of international organizations has led to an increase 
in the institutionalization of international law); Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: 
Three Local Government Models and Immigration Regulations, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 453, 
476 (2008) (discussing, in part, the role of cities as “global legal actors in the 
international legal regime”); Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348 (2006) (discussing how nongovernmental 
organizations have successfully lobbied for increased participation in 
international lawmaking processes); Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still 
Matters—Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 140 (2005) (evaluating “whether the role non-state actors 
play in making, applying, and interpreting treaties has changed who is truly 
authorized to form treaties”); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to 
International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 125 (2005) [hereinafter Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach] (proposing that public and 
private practitioners play a role in “bottom-up” international lawmaking); Janet 
Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven 
School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007) [hereinafter Levit, 
Reflections on the New Haven School] (analyzing bottom-up international 
lawmaking through the lens of the New Haven school of thought); Julie Mertus, 
From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of 
Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335 (1999) [hereinafter Mertus, 
Transnational Civil Society] (detailing how “[n]on-state actors and transnational 
networks now play a greater role in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in local, regional, and international arenas”); Julie Mertus, Kitchen Table 
Lessons: Why the Local Matters, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 307 (2000) [hereinafter 
Mertus, Kitchen Table] (discussing how social movements may impact the 
development and internalization of international norms); Christiana Ochoa, The 
Individual and Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119 (2007) 
(discussing the role of the individual in customary international lawmaking); Hari 
M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for 
Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1789, 1855 (2005) (proposing 
that “governmental actors are playing a critical role in shaping a transnational 
regulatory process” with respect to climate change). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/4
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international lawmaking nor comprehensive treatment regarding 
the normative implications of such participation.12  Another stream 
focuses on indigenous peoples’ status and rights under 
international human rights law.13  While a subset of this literature 
addresses indigenous peoples’ role in human rights advocacy and 
norm-building, it nevertheless does not comprehensively address 
the normative implications of indigenous peoples’ participatory 
role.14  This Article seeks to bridge, and build upon, these two 
streams of literature to provide a discrete narrative of indigenous 
peoples’ participation in international lawmaking and a more 
 
12 See infra Part 2.1. 
13 See, e.g., Leonardo J. Alvarado, Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation 
of Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case of 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 609 (2007) (analyzing 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
communal property rights in the Awas Tingni case and suggesting that 
“indigenous peoples are increasingly utilizing international human rights 
institutions to defend their lands, territories, and cultures, and for their survival”); 
S. James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to 
International Human Rights Law, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 107, 111 (2006) (detailing 
the contributions of indigenous peoples to human rights law); Russel Lawrence 
Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (1994) (analyzing international trends in the 1990s and 
concluding that indigenous people have begun to develop a distinctive 
international identity as well as a distinctive set of rights in international law); 
Erik B. Bluemel, Separating Instrumental from Intrinsic Rights: Toward an 
Understanding of Indigenous Participation in International Rule-Making, 30 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 55, 57 (2005–2006) (arguing for “a more coherent framework 
advanced for the debate about group participatory rights, more legitimacy 
provided to group participation, and an enhanced understanding of what forces 
drive participation in international law” through an analysis of indigenous 
peoples’ participation in the international arena); Elena Cirkovic, Self-
Determination and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 375, 
375–78 (2006–2007) (analyzing the potential of utilizing international human 
rights law to address indigenous peoples’ claims for self-determination); Robert T. 
Coulter, Using International Human Rights Mechanisms to Promote and Protect Rights 
of Indian Nations and Tribes in the United States: An Overview, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
573 (2006–2007) [hereinafter Coulter, International Human Rights Mechanisms] 
(suggesting that international legal procedures offer Native Americans an 
effective means through which to expand their rights); Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 
45 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 539 (2009) [hereinafter Coulter, The U.N. Declaration] (calling 
the declaration historic because it contains “legal elements never before included 
in a major human rights instrument”); Maivân Clech Lâm, Making Room for Peoples 
at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 
25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 621 (1992) (proposing that the U.N. provide “fora for 
indigenous people and other ethnic groups to question state decisions and 
arrangements that affect them”). 
14 See infra Part 2.2. 
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comprehensive discussion regarding the implications of such 
participation.15 
2.1. International Lawmaking and Non-State Actors 
Viewed through a positivist lens, international law is 
ultimately produced through state consent.16  Pursuant to such a 
perspective, states are deemed the subjects of international law, 
and thereby constitute the proper participants in processes of 
international lawmaking.17  However, international lawmaking has 
alternatively been understood as a complex and dynamic process 
of decision-making that includes the participation of non-state 
actors.18  Viewed through such alternative lens, non-state actors 
“play important roles in influencing decision outcomes.”19  In 
effect, such a view not only permits, but requires, a robust analysis 
of non-state actors’ participation in international lawmaking. 
International law scholars, whether explicitly or implicitly 
drawing upon such an alternative conception of international 
lawmaking, have developed a subset of literature that identifies, 
describes, and questions the role of non-state actors in international 
norm-building and decision-making processes.20  These analyses 
 
15 While this Part provides a general overview of the two paradigmatic 
streams of literature that impact the analyses in this Article, it is not meant to 
exhaustively capture any particular author’s scholarly contribution. 
16 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of 
Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 83 (2007) (“State consent could provide a positivist 
basis for international law in the absence of a sovereign and could be used as a 
scientific criterion of investigation.”). 
17 Id. at 83–85.  In this Article, I treat analyses of international lawmaking as 
related to, but nevertheless distinct from, analyses of state compliance with 
international law.  For analyses that focus more directly on state compliance with 
international law and the role of non-state actors, see generally Harold Hongju 
Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559 
(2007); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); 
Harold Hongju Koh, The Value of Process, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 27 (2005). 
18 See generally McDougal & Reisman, supra note 11; Reisman et al., supra note 
11; see also Symposium, Foreward to The “New” New Haven School: International 
Law—Past, Present, & Future, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 299 (2007) (discussing the history, 
impact, and future of the New Haven School on international legal theory and 
scholarship). 
19 Reisman et al., supra note 11, at 578. 
20 See generally Levit, Reflections on the New Haven School, supra note 11 
(conveying the importance of “bottom-up” international lawmaking); Mertus, 
Kitchen Table, supra note 11 (exploring how social movements wield influence over 
international norms); Mertus, Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11 (arguing 
that non-state actors play a role in protecting human rights). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss1/4
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offer a thicker description of non-state actors’ participation, lend 
greater philosophical and theoretical coherency to non-state actors’ 
operational realities, and make important normative contributions 
regarding the role of non-state actors in international lawmaking.21  
As a whole, the normative thrust of existing literature focuses on 
the effects of non-state actor participation on the international legal 
regime.  For example, international law scholars’ normative 
insights address how non-state actor participation impacts the 
appropriate scope of international law,22 the efficiency and 
legitimacy of alternative approaches to making international law,23 
and the need to, and potential for, democratizing international 
lawmaking processes.24 
More specifically, at the macro-level, attention has been 
devoted to distinguishing between non-state actors’ participation 
in “top-down” versus “bottom-up” lawmaking processes.25  At a 
more micro-level, scholars have addressed the participatory role of 
a variety of non-state actors.  In this latter vein, scholars have 
canvassed the role of supra-national, transnational, and sub-
national non-state actors in international lawmaking.  At the supra-
 
21 See generally Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach, supra note 11 (proposing that 
public and private practitioners play a role in “bottom-up” international 
lawmaking); Mertus, Kitchen Table, supra note 11; Mertus, Transnational Civil 
Society, supra note 11. 
22 See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 11, at 136 (critiquing foundational literature that 
discusses, but dismisses, the role of non-state actors in the formation of customary 
international law); Osofsky, supra note 11, at 1797–80 (surveying the impact of 
corporations on international lawmaking); Reisman et al., supra note 11, at 578 
(providing that “participants in any decision process include those formally 
endowed with decision competence, such as executives, legislators and judges, 
and all those other actors who, though not endowed with formal competence, 
may nonetheless play important roles in influencing decision outcomes”). 
23 See generally Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach, supra note 11, at 209 (suggesting 
that bottom-up international lawmaking is a legitimate alternative route to law in 
the realm of international trade and finance where most scholarship focuses on 
treaty-based institutions). 
24 See Mertus, Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11, at 1361 (noting that 
global democratic governance has yet to be fully realized).  Professor Mertus 
focuses on the paradox between the “existence of a robust civil society as a 
precondition to democratic governance,” and the way that “transnational civil 
society may undermine this norm of democratic governance since voluntary 
associations are wholly unaccountable to any sovereign and, thus, may act in a 
manner contrary to democratic principles.”  Id. at 1340. 
25 See Levit, Reflections on the New Haven School, supra note 11, at 408–10 
(noting that literature discussing “bottom-up” international lawmaking has 
contributed distinct insights on the norm-building processes that homogenous, 
sub-national groups may engage in). 
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national scale, much analysis has been devoted to the role of 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization, as participants in international lawmaking.26  
Attention has also been devoted to the role of transnational 
entities, such as non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”),27 
transnational civil society,28 and transnational networks.29  The 
literature further includes specific treatment of participation by 
sub-national public entities, such as autonomous non-state 
groupings30 and cities,31 as well as private entities, such as 
corporate actors,32 private practitioners,33 and individuals.34 
While some of this literature includes passing references to the 
participatory role of indigenous peoples, it does not provide a 
discrete narrative of indigenous peoples’ role in international 
lawmaking nor comprehensive treatment regarding the normative 
 
26 See generally Alvarez, Governing the World, supra note 11 (discussing how 
the creation of inter-governmental organizations leads to fundamental changes in 
international law); Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, supra note 
11 (discussing the institutionalization of international law through the 
establishment of international organizations). 
27 See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 11 (evaluating the influence that non-
governmental organizations exert over international law); Dinah Shelton, 
Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273 
(2002) (arguing that globalization has increased the involvement of non-state 
actors in human rights issues with the resulting paradox that human rights are 
promoted, yet, at the same time, violated in “unforeseen ways”). 
28 See generally Mertus, Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11 (proposing 
that transnational civil society plays an increased role in the promotion of human 
rights). 
29 See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 239–40 (2004) 
(discussing the ability of transnational networks to aggregate policy). 
30 See generally Hollis, supra note 11 (discussing sub-state actor participation). 
31 See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 11, at 1806–07 (noting that cities, by serving as 
petitioners in litigation, can advance greater regulation in certain contexts).  See 
generally Aoki, supra note 11 (surveying how cities have injected themselves into 
the international sphere, particularly in international human rights lawmaking). 
32 See, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of 
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
931, 957–58 (2004) (discussing how transnational corporations help shape informal 
social norms that impact domestic and international law). 
33 See, e.g., Levit, Reflections on the New Haven School, supra note 11, at 411 
(proposing that private actors, which include private individuals in addition to 
NGOs and corporations, “do not merely exert influence on . . . lawmaking 
processes but in fact constitute such processes and make law themselves”). 
34 See generally Ochoa, supra note 11 (discussing how individuals have the 
capacity to influence customary international law). 
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implications of such participation.35  For example, at the macro-
level, a narrative of indigenous peoples’ role in international 
lawmaking defies a “top-down/bottom-up” dichotomy.  
Indigenous peoples’ participation reflects a bottom-up 
transnational social movement that engages both informal 
mechanisms of knowledge production and norm-generation and 
formal, top-down decision-making structures with the aim of 
establishing indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness.  More specifically, 
sub-national, identity-based local communities—such as the Awas 
Tingni in Nicaragua, U’wa in Colombia, and Western Shoshone in 
the United States—resist local challenges that present affronts to 
the exercise of cultural practices, control over lands and resources, 
or other forms of exercising meaningful self-determination.  As a 
means of furthering such resistance to local circumstances, these 
communities engage informal mechanisms of transnational 
knowledge production such as transnational networks and non-
governmental organizations.  They further engage formal channels 
of decision-making through advocacy before international and 
regional human rights bodies.  Indigenous communities’ multi-
layered participatory efforts focus on strategically identifying core 
indigenous norms and values that distinguish indigenous 
communities from other groups.  These efforts serve as a 
foundation for the recognition of a distinctive transnational 
identity and framework of rights. 
Furthermore, at the micro-level, indigenous peoples’ 
participatory role in international lawmaking is not appropriately 
cabined within existing categories of analysis.  Indigenous peoples 
may, indeed, constitute members of non-governmental 
organizations, participate in transnational civil society, organize as 
transnational public networks, function as autonomous non-state 
groupings, and bear individual identities.  Nevertheless, 
indigenous peoples are best understood as comprising a loose 
transnational network composed of sub-national, identity-based, 
local communities. 
Accordingly, indigenous peoples’ role in international 
lawmaking merits greater attention.  An account of indigenous 
peoples’ role in international human rights lawmaking is a 
necessary component of the broader narrative of non-state actor 
participation in international lawmaking.  Moreover, shifting focus 
 
35 See infra Part 2.2. 
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to the participatory role of a traditionally marginalized community 
broadens normative categories of analysis.  Normative questions 
arise more explicitly not only with respect to what such 
participation does to, or for, international law, but also with 
respect to what such participation does to, or for, indigenous 
peoples. 
2.2. International Lawmaking and Indigenous Peoples 
The literature that addresses indigenous peoples’ status and 
rights under international human rights law has devoted some 
attention to indigenous peoples’ participatory role in human rights 
advocacy and norm-building.  However, such analyses are not 
explicitly tied to the broader literature on non-state actor 
participation in international lawmaking.  Accordingly, they do not 
purport to identify or develop a distinctive narrative describing 
how indigenous peoples’ participation in international lawmaking 
fits within the broader literature concerning non-state actors.  They 
also do not develop the normative implications of indigenous 
peoples’ participation with respect to the advancement and 
realization of indigenous peoples’ claims. 
Drawing on the dichotomy between “subjects” and “objects” of 
international law, some literature claims that indigenous peoples 
now constitute “subjects of international law.”36  While this 
conclusion suggests that indigenous peoples bear a personality 
under international law commensurate with participation in 
international lawmaking, these references do not develop a 
discrete narrative of indigenous peoples’ participation in 
international lawmaking or the implications of such participation.37 
 
36 See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 13 (proposing that indigenous peoples be viewed 
as “subjects” rather than objects of international law); Cirkovic, supra note 13 
(examining “the struggle over the recognition of indigenous peoples as subjects 
under public international law”); Lâm, supra note 13 (arguing that international 
law “may have to be reconceived . . . to include peoples as well as states as its 
rightful subjects”). 
37 See Barsh, supra note 13, at 33–35 (tracing the growing acceptance of 
indigenous peoples’ collective identity and distinct rights in international law and 
practice and arguing that explicit recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination would establish indigenous peoples as “subjects of international 
legal rights and duties rather than mere objects of international concern”); 
Cirkovic, supra note 13, at 375–76 (examining “the struggle over the recognition of 
indigenous peoples as subjects under public international law”); Lâm, supra note 
13, at 621 (proposing that indigenous peoples be recognized as “subjects of 
international law competent to represent their interests in the international 
arena”). 
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Some analyses go further by implicitly providing support for, 
and important elements of, an independent narrative concerning 
indigenous peoples’ role in international human rights 
lawmaking.38  For example, there is ample literature that addresses 
indigenous peoples’ human rights advocacy with respect to their 
claims before international and regional human rights bodies.39  
This literature identifies and analyzes the doctrinal sources of 
indigenous peoples’ human rights arguments, and further, 
suggests that indigenous peoples have been at the forefront of such 
advocacy efforts.40  Additionally, there is literature that discusses 
the mechanics of navigating the human rights institutional regime 
as a means of providing helpful guidance on appropriate avenues 
of advocacy.41  This literature focuses on the international and 
regional human rights forums that provide indigenous peoples 
 
38 See generally ANAYA, supra note 4; S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., 
The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under 
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001) (proposing 
that “the Inter-American human rights system recognizes and protects indigenous 
peoples’ rights over their traditional lands and resources, and that it establishes 
for states corresponding international legal obligations”); Coulter, The U.N. 
Declaration, supra note 13, at 539 (calling the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples historic because it contains “legal elements never before 
included in a major human rights instrument”); Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling 
Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International 
and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 189–90 (2001) (observing that 
indigenous peoples’ legal claims rest on five distinct conceptual structures: “(1) 
human rights and non-discrimination claims; (2) minority claims; (3) self-
determination claims; (4) historic sovereignty claims; and (5) claims as indigenous 
peoples, including claims based on treaties or other agreements between 
indigenous peoples and states”); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous 
Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
57 (1999) (discussing both the conquest and dispossession of indigenous peoples’ 
lands and the mechanisms by which they have gained increased recognition and 
participation in international law). 
39 See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 4; Anaya & Williams, supra note 38 (discussing 
the contemporary indigenous peoples’ movement in which representatives for 
indigenous peoples more frequently advocate for their rights before human rights 
bodies); Wiessner, supra note 38, at 120–26 (discussing developments in 
indigenous peoples’ claims to collective rights and avenues of enforcement). 
40 ANAYA, supra note 4, at 56 (“The international system’s contemporary 
treatment of indigenous peoples is the result of activity over the last few decades. 
This activity has involved, and substantially been driven by, indigenous peoples 
themselves.”). 
41 See Coulter, International Human Rights Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 575–89 
(discussing the “international bodies” through which Indian nations and tribes 
may assert their rights). 
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with opportunities for voicing their claims and seeking redress.42  
While these two streams of literature implicitly support the 
existence of an independent narrative of indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international lawmaking, they do not explicitly 
develop the discrete substantive contours or implications of such 
narrative. 
A few analyses provide more explicit support for, and 
development of, a discrete narrative of indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international lawmaking and its normative 
implications.  There is literature that addresses the possible 
justifications for indigenous peoples’ participation in international 
lawmaking.43  This literature bridges the gap between the broader 
recognition of participatory rights in international lawmaking 
processes and possible normative theories that could appropriately 
justify indigenous peoples’ participatory role.44  Moreover, there is 
some development in the literature regarding the possible 
normative implications of indigenous peoples’ participation; 
however, much of this literature focuses on the implications of 
such participation with respect to the constitution of international 
law rather than with respect to the continued advancement and 
further operationalization of indigenous peoples’ claims.45 
Ultimately, while this subset of literature recognizes, and 
provides support for, the proposition that indigenous peoples have 
played a role in human rights lawmaking, further development of 
 
42 See id. 
43 See Bluemel, supra note 13, at 72 (discussing shortcomings of the 
mainstream literature that articulates justifications for indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international lawmaking). 
44 See id. at 60 (focusing on indigenous peoples’ participation in human rights 
lawmaking, Bluemel “seeks to understand group participation by looking at the 
relationship between the various actors in the international system and the values 
enhanced or undermined by such group participation”). 
45 See Anaya, supra note 13, at 118–19 (focusing on the impact of indigenous 
peoples’ participation in international lawmaking with respect to human rights 
law).  There is also a stream of related literature that does not specifically deal 
with non-state actor participation in international lawmaking, but addresses the 
use of the human rights discourse as a discourse of resistance by traditionally 
marginalized communities, including indigenous peoples.  See generally 
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) (discussing the 
emergence of transnational resistance by indigenous peoples); LAW AND 
GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura De 
Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005) (synthesizing case 
studies of grassroots movements advocating for global social justice). 
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this narrative, as well as  the broader normative implications that 
may flow from it, are merited.  Unlike the existing narratives of 
non-state actor participation in international lawmaking, the 
narrative of indigenous peoples’ participation is one that 
showcases the nuances of participation by a traditionally 
marginalized community.  Procedurally, indigenous peoples’ 
participation highlights a multi-layered approach to international 
lawmaking through both informal avenues of knowledge 
production and norm-generation, and formal, top-down structures 
engaged in decision-making.  Substantively, indigenous peoples’ 
participation showcases the ability of a traditionally marginalized 
community to succeed in strategically facilitating the recognition of 
a distinctive international legal identity and substantive 
reconstitution of human rights precepts.  Furthermore, such a 
narrative provides normative insights regarding the implications 
of participation with respect to indigenous peoples’ realization of 
their claims.  Moreover, the narrative has the potential to provide 
normative insights regarding possible dissonance between what 
such participation does to, or for, international law, and what it 
does to, or for, indigenous peoples.  Ultimately, such analysis can 
serve as a platform for identifying the possibilities and limits of 
engaging international human rights lawmaking processes as 
avenues of resistance or tools of social transformation for 
traditionally marginalized communities. 
3. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAWMAKING 
Indigenous peoples have participated in international 
lawmaking as a means of reconstituting international and, 
derivatively, national legal frameworks that significantly bypass 
their historical subordination.  The project of reconstituting 
international law, specifically human rights law, was pursued by 
indigenous peoples as a means of organizing transnational 
resistance to continuing affronts to their way of life.  Human rights 
offered a normative framework  potentially capable of lending 
legitimacy to indigenous peoples’ local, anti-subordination 
struggles and of translating indigenous peoples’ claims into 
recognizable rights.  To that end, indigenous peoples engaged in 
both informal mechanisms of knowledge production and norm-
generation, and formal, top-down decision-making structures.  
Through such participation, indigenous peoples have been 
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successful in identifying and uploading core normative precepts 
that distinguish indigenous peoples from other groups.  The 
emphasis on precepts of communal association and existence, as 
well as cultural and religious ties to lands and resources, have 
facilitated the recognition of a distinctive indigenous peoples 
category and shaped the substantive scope of human rights 
applicable to indigenous peoples. 
3.1. Emergence as Participants in International Lawmaking 
The “emergence” of indigenous peoples as participants in 
international law did not become a part of international law 
discourse until the latter part of the twentieth century.  Indeed, 
indigenous peoples’ status and rights have been historically 
limited under international law.  Only in the past forty years have 
indigenous peoples, through a convergence of sociopolitical 
factors, been able to incrementally play a significant participatory 
role in international lawmaking processes. 
During the colonial period, indigenous peoples were, for the 
most part, ideologically constructed as irrational and uncivilized.46 
Furthermore, during the post-colonial period of state formation, 
the doctrine of sovereignty developed from a Eurocentric 
perspective to privilege existing  European or European-derived 
territorial arrangements as states.47  Because indigenous peoples’ 
associational, social, and political structures did not resemble the 
contours of the territorial state, indigenous peoples were not 
considered sovereigns under international law.48  Moreover, even 
the early post-World War II era of decolonization and human 
rights bypassed indigenous peoples.  The post-World War II 
decolonization project, grounded in human rights precepts, 
promoted the right of peoples to self-determination.49  However, 
 
46 During the colonial period, debates between leading intellectuals focused 
on the proper treatment of “newly discovered” peoples.  See generally BARTOLOMÉ 
DE LAS CASAS, HISTORY OF THE INDIES (Andrée Collard ed. and trans., 1971) 
(chronicling early interactions between Europeans and indigenous peoples in the 
West Indies); FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 
(Ernest Nys ed., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1917) (1557) (collecting the 
perspectives of the Spanish theologian, Franciscus de Victoria, on indigenous 
peoples in the West Indies). 
47 See ANAYA, supra note 4, at 19–31 (discussing the dominance of the early 
Eurocentric modern state system). 
48 See id. at 26–31 (discussing the positivist approach to international law 
regarding treatment of indigenous peoples). 
49 See id. at 53–54. 
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self-determination applied only to an overseas colonial territory as 
a whole, irrespective of pre-colonial enclaves of indigenous 
peoples existing within the colonial territories and colonizing 
states.50 
Nevertheless, the convergence of four primary factors during 
the past forty years has contributed to indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international norm-building and decision-making 
processes: (1) shifts in ideological conceptions of indigeneity; (2) 
local affronts to indigenous peoples’ way of life and greater 
opportunities for transnational coalition-building, simultaneously 
facilitated by circumstances of globalization; (3) attention under 
international law to promoting ideals of participatory democracy; 
and (4) advocacy by indigenous peoples aimed at greater 
recognition of participatory rights. 
First, indigenous peoples’ incremental participation in 
international lawmaking would probably not have been possible 
without significant shifts in ideological conceptions of indigeneity.  
The idea of indigeneity was originally associated with savage 
inferiority as a means of justifying colonization and the continued 
subordination of communities of first peoples.51  Historically, the 
idea of indigeneity remained  tied to notions of cultural inferiority, 
resulting in either the perpetual marginalization or mandated 
assimilation of indigenous peoples.52  In the latter vein, policies of 
 
50 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), para. 5, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg., 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
Immediate steps shall be taken, in . . . territories which have not yet 
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the people of those 
territories . . . in accordance with their freely expressed will and 
desire . . . in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and 
freedom. 
Id.; see also G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), princ. IV, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 948th plen. mtg., 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 1960) (hinging the application of self-
determination to geographically separate territories). 
51 See generally G. C. Marks, Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The 
Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas, 13 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 
1, 37–39, 49–53 (1990–1991) (articulating the debate regarding the relationship 
between “newly discovered” first peoples and colonizing states). 
52 The ideology of assimilation is reflected in international legal contexts as 
well as national social and legal contexts.  For example, the first comprehensive 
treaty addressing the status and rights of indigenous peoples’ under international 
law, ILO Convention 107, is premised on notions of integration.  See Convention 
(No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other 
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, ILO 
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sociopolitical dependency on state structures and programs of 
indigenous acculturation emerged as vehicles of expeditious 
incorporation into dominant legal and social frameworks.53 
Arguably, today, there has been a significant rejection of 
assimilationist ideology in favor of a recognition of  difference 
based on indigenous peoples’ distinctive cultural, religious, 
associational, and political orders.  Assimilation ultimately became 
associated with discriminatory practices leading to cultural 
genocide—the shattering of communal ties through the imposition 
of Eurocentric legal and social transplants.54  Also, assimilation as a 
social policy simply proved ineffective; it ignited further resistance 
from local communities of indigenous peoples that sought to 
preserve an independent identity and way of life.   
Ultimately, overarching normative and political shifts lead to a 
more comprehensive and less discriminatory ideology of 
indigenous peoples grounded in indigenous peoples’ own 
 
No. 4738, pt. 1 art. 2, 2(c), 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into force June 5, 1959) 
(including measures for “creating possibilities of national integration to the 
exclusion of measures tending towards the artificial assimilation of these 
populations”).  At the domestic level, social contexts determined the viability of 
programs of assimilation.  While in some states, efforts and programs aimed at 
greater integration and assimilation were perceived as too great a grant of 
increased status, other states fully engaged such approach.  See Marie Corcoran, 
Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Jurisdiction of Rape, the Indian Child Welfare Act, and the 
Struggle for Tribal Self-Determination, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 415, 428–30 
(2009) (discussing Congress’s recognition of problems associated with the 
assimilation of American Indians and the effect of this recognition on the passage 
of the Indian Child Welfare Act); Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal 
Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 923 (2003) (discussing the relationship between 
Native nations and the U.S. government with respect to assimilation, integration, 
and self-determination); Pamela O’Connor, Squaring the Circle: How Canada is 
Dealing with the Legacy of its Indian Residential Schools Experiment, 28 INT’L J. LEGAL 
INFO. 232, 239–40 (2000) (noting the Canadian government’s approach to 
assimilation of Native children through education). 
53 See ANAYA, supra note 4, at 31–34 (articulating the “trusteeship doctrine,” 
which aimed to “civilize” indigenous peoples). 
54 The rejection of assimilation as an overarching policy for the management 
of indigenous peoples is evident in the revision processes undertaken by the ILO 
with respect to ILO Convention 107.  The product of that revisionary process, ILO 
Convention 169, reflects a progression toward the recognition of indigenous 
peoples as a distinct social group.  See International Labour Organization,  
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
28 I.L.M. 1382, 1384 (entered into force June 27, 1989) (“[I]t [is] appropriate to 
adopt new international standards . . . removing the assimilationist orientation of 
the earlier standards .  .  .  .”). 
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accounts of their lived experiences.55  This continuously evolving  
ideology is primarily one of indigenous peoples’ survival as 
distinct communities which are now constrained within domestic 
and international legal and institutional systems that did not 
foresee their endurance.  In this vein, indigenous peoples have 
extolled their religious, cultural, and political differences as 
reasons for greater self-determination.  They have sought to 
harness this developing ideology to gain legal redress for their 
historical subordination and contemporary claims at the 
international scale.  Ultimately, legal developments in human 
rights law during the latter part of the twentieth century reflect a 
recognition, accommodation, and progression of such ideology. 
Second, circumstances of globalization have facilitated 
indigenous peoples’ participatory role in international lawmaking.  
While circumstances of globalization have led to increased affronts 
on indigenous peoples’ way of life, they have also prompted and 
enabled the transnational organization of local communities of 
indigenous peoples.  On the one hand, globalization has arguably 
led to increasing assaults by states and non-state actors, such as 
corporate entities, on indigenous peoples’ ability to determine their 
own futures.56  For example, the deregulation of market forces has 
 
55 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 259–60 (situating a shift regarding 
the status of indigenous peoples and the affirmation of indigenous rights during 
the last quarter of the century within the confluence of several normative and 
political changes, including (1) a paradigmatic shift from an “uncontested notion 
of ‘development’ typical of the post-war era” toward a model of “‘participatory 
development’” or “‘ethno-development,’” (2) a progression in the liberal model of 
“‘universal citizenship’” based on notions of assimilation and integration toward 
a model of “‘multicultural citizenship’” based on the acknowledgement of 
cultural distinctions, and (3) a “generalized political and intellectual attack” on 
existing anthropological conceptions of indigenism that promoted integrationist 
governmental policies). 
56 See Richard Falk, The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and the New 
Jurisprudence of Global Civil Society, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 333, 335–36 
(1997) (proposing the following distinction between globalization from above and 
globalization from below: “the restructuring of the world economy on a regional 
and global scale through the agency of the transnational corporation and financial 
markets from above, and the rise of transnational social forces concerned with 
environmental protection, human rights, and peace and human security from 
below”); see also RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 9 (2003) (suggesting that indigenous identity has been 
created, in part, as a result of the “shared experiences of marginalized groups 
facing the negative impacts of resource extraction and economic modernization 
and . . . the social convergence and homogenization that these ambitions tend to 
bring about”); Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and 
Violations of Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and 
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potentially made it easier for transnational corporate actors to 
engage in large infrastructure and natural resource extraction 
projects on indigenous peoples’ claimed lands.57  On the other 
hand, circumstances of globalization have led to the rise in 
participation of non-state actors in international lawmaking.58  
Scholars have suggested that globalization, from above and from 
below, has changed the role of states in global governance and, 
concurrently, increased the opportunities for non-state actors and 
transnational networks to participate in global governance.59 
Two specific circumstances of globalization have primarily 
facilitated indigenous peoples’ participation in global governance: 
(1) the increasing interdependence at the global level where the 
activities of people in one locality have repercussions elsewhere, 
and (2) the increasing fragmentation of states into autonomous 
groups.60  Increasing interdependence at the global level has 
prompted local communities of indigenous peoples to organize 
themselves transnationally.  Since the activities of one indigenous 
community could have repercussions on the activities of another 
indigenous community elsewhere, coalition-building at the 
international scale has presented an opportunity for greater gains.  
An increasing fragmentation of states has also prompted local 
communities of indigenous peoples to organize themselves 
transnationally.  If state entities are giving way to other types of 
autonomous groupings, then coalition-building at the international 
scale serves as an avenue of survival.  It presents a greater 
 
Accountability Under International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135 (2007) 
(canvassing the impacts of corporate entities on the promotion and protection of 
indigenous peoples’ land rights). 
57 See Miranda, supra note 56, at 154–60 (discussing the effects of “hybrid 
state-corporate activity” on indigenous peoples’ lands). 
58 See Mertus, Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11, at 1341 (proposing that 
globalization has been a catalyst for the increase of non-state actor participation in 
the international human rights system). 
59 See id. at 1341–42 (articulating the notion of globalization from above and 
below). 
60 See id. at 1342–46 (emphasizing four dimensions of globalization that have 
had an impact on the increase of non-state actor participation at the international 
scale: (1) “an increasing interdependence at the world level, where the activities of 
people in a specific area have repercussions that go beyond local, regional, or 
national borders,” (2) “fragmentation of States and peoples into autonomous 
groups and areas,” (3) “homogenization of the world wherein ‘instead of 
differences among territorial units which were mutually exclusive, there is now a 
uniformity,’” and (4) the undercutting of “homogeneity by producing 
diversification within territorial communities”). 
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opportunity for continued existence amidst a world of changing 
borders, fluid groupings, and tenuous identities. 
Third, interest in the achievement of democratic global 
governance has facilitated the recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
participatory role in international lawmaking.61  Democratic global 
governance has been linked to notions of “good” governance or 
legitimacy in governance.62  It involves the “participation for the 
peoples of the world, independent of governmental 
representation.”63  In this context, the increasing participatory role 
of indigenous peoples in international lawmaking can be 
understood as a functional necessity of addressing pressing issues 
of human dignity and providing greater legitimacy to a key 
component of international governance: international lawmaking. 
Fourth, as a means of advancing their claims, communities of 
indigenous peoples have strategically pursued recourse at the 
international scale.  Through such engagement, communities have 
specifically advocated for, and furthered the recognition of, 
participatory rights in decision-making processes that have an 
impact on their way of life.64  Such participatory rights function at 
all levels of decision-making: local, national, and international.65  
They specifically include the right to prior informed consultation 
or consent with respect to state activities that impact their ancestral 
 
61 See Falk, supra note 56, at 334 (discussing “the emergence of transnational 
democratic tendencies as a feature of the international legal order”); Mertus, 
Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11, at 1361 (proposing that “democratic 
governance” continues to grow on a global scale).  See generally Richard Falk, What 
Comes After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 243 (2007) 
[hereinafter Falk, What Comes After]. 
62 See Mertus, Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11, at 1352 (looking to the 
World Bank’s definition of “good governance”). 
63 Falk, What Comes After, supra note 61, at 251. 
64 See James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to 
Decisions About Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What 
Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 
16 (2005) (“[i]ndicat[ing] a general norm duty on states to consult with indigenous 
peoples and accommodate their concerns whenever state action is contemplated 
that would affect their interests”); Bluemel, supra note 13, at 77–78 (discussing 
indigenous peoples’ right to participate in lawmaking processes). 
65 See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, arts. 5, 15, 17–19, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP] (articulating indigenous 
peoples’ rights to self-determination and participation in political processes). 
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lands and resources66 and the right to participate in governmental 
policy-setting and decision-making.67 
In sum, a convergence of these four factors has facilitated the 
emergence of indigenous peoples as participants in international 
lawmaking.  Indigenous peoples have contributed to, and 
employed, a developing ideology that emphasizes cultural 
difference as a reason for the recognition of a distinctive identity 
commensurate with specifically designed rights.  Circumstances of 
globalization have offered local communities of indigenous 
peoples both common experiences of continued subordination and 
greater opportunities for transnationally sharing those experiences 
and developing strategies of resistance that hinge on participation 
in international lawmaking.  An increased focus on the benefits of 
greater direct participation by non-state actors in global 
governance, has, in turn, enabled the recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ participatory rights at such level.  Indeed, academics, 
activists, and policy-makers have begun to refer to the 
“emergence” of indigenous peoples in international lawmaking 
processes. 
3.2. Translation of Claims into Human Rights 
Indigenous peoples have engaged the human rights framework 
to translate their claims into recognizable rights.  Indigenous 
peoples’ claims include increased protection over cultural 
practices, greater control over ancestral lands and resources, and 
ultimately, the meaningful exercise of self-determination.  To 
advance their claims, indigenous communities have identified and 
emphasized attributes that distinguish them from other groups, 
and consequently, have argued that generally applicable human 
rights should be interpreted to account for such distinctive 
attributes.  Indigenous peoples’ efforts have resulted in the 
 
66 See id. art. 32(2). 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with . . . indigenous 
peoples . . . in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
Id. 
67 See id. arts. 5, 18–19 (declaring that indigenous peoples should be actively 
included in decision-making processes, especially regarding decisions that affect 
them directly). 
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recognition of a distinctive indigenous identity capable of 
triggering a specific set of human rights.68 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that indigenous 
peoples’ claims do not need to be cabined within the discourse of 
human rights.  For example, the claims of indigenous peoples may 
be conceptualized as minority claims, self-determination claims by 
a colonized peoples, historical sovereignty claims by first peoples, 
and sui generis as indigenous peoples’ claims based on treaty or 
other agreements with states.69  However, while indigenous 
peoples’ claims may be grounded in more than one category, many 
claims have been designed as primarily human rights claims and 
channeled through the human rights system.70  The formulation of 
indigenous peoples’ claims as human rights is not without 
controversy.  While a significant number of scholars, indigenous 
peoples’ representatives, and state representatives have supported 
the channeling of indigenous peoples’ claims through the human 
rights discourse, others have argued that the discourse’s “equal 
rights rhetoric” as well as its system of implementation and 
enforcement itself are inherently unjust, flawed, or insufficient.71  
Nevertheless, advocates of indigenous peoples’ rights at the 
international scale may be relying on the human rights program 
while acknowledging that it “might be made more useful by 
reform,” and “leav[ing] for later consideration the question [of] 
whether a reformed human rights program could ever 
satisfactorily address all the issues, and in particular, whether a 
 
68 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 258 (“Contemporary discourse on 
‘the rights of indigenous peoples’ or ‘indigenous rights’ refers to the 
concretization of generally applicable human rights principles to the specific 
circumstances of, and demands from [indigenous] peoples.”). 
69 See Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 190 (identifying conceptual structures 
pursuant to which indigenous peoples form claims).  See generally S. James Anaya, 
Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over 
Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 237, 240–42 (2005). 
70 The discourse of human rights has not been the only means of 
contemporary advocacy on behalf of indigenous peoples.  See Anaya, supra note 
69, at 239–42 (addressing the divergence and interplay of discourses regarding 
historical sovereignty and human rights).  Nevertheless, indigenous peoples have 
found their greatest success by grounding their contemporary claims within the 
discourse of human rights.  Id. at 241. 
71 See Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 193–94.  As suggested by Professor 
Kingsbury, this line of argumentation is akin to “Derrick Bell’s critique of the civil 
rights struggle as channeling energies of black Americans into areas of symbolic 
success but with limited impact on underlying problems.”  Id. 
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distinct category of indigenous peoples’ rights ought to exist 
alongside the human rights program and other international legal 
structures.”72 
Specifically, indigenous peoples have grounded their claims on 
human rights articulated in declarations and treaties, such as the 
right to self-determination,73 the right to not be discriminated 
against,74 the right to cultural integrity,75 and the right to 
property.76  These human rights have been interpreted to account 
for indigenous peoples’ identification of political, associational, 
religious, and cultural distinctiveness and contemporary 
circumstances that present affronts by states to preservation of 
their way of life and control over their ancestral lands and 
resources.  For example, human rights precepts of self-
determination and non-discrimination have been interpreted to 
protect indigenous peoples’ claims of a distinctive indigenous 
identity and way of life.77  Additionally, human rights precepts of 
 
72 Kingsbury, supra note 38, at 194. 
73 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (providing for the right to self-determination); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, para. 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“All peoples have the right of self determination.”). 
74 Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. 
GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 122-23, U.N. Doc. A/32/18 Annex V. (Aug. 
18, 1997), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0 
/73984290dfea022b802565160056fe1c?Opendocument. 
75 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 73, art. 
27, para. 3 (providing that members of minority populations “shall not be denied 
the right . . . to enjoy their own culture”); see also ANAYA, supra note 4, at 134 
(proposing that article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights is representative of customary international law). 
76 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 17, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (providing, inter alia, that “[e]veryone 
has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others,” and 
“[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property”); see also American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXVIII, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948), available at http://www.oas.org 
/juridico/English/ga-Res98/Eres1591.htm [hereinafter American Declaration]; 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221  (providing that “every . . . person 
is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”); Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.cidh.org 
/Basicos/English/Basic1.%20Intro.htm [hereinafter American Convention] 
(“Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.”). 
77 See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International 
Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L., no. 2, 1991 at 1, 32 (discussing the principle of self-
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self-determination, non-discrimination, cultural integrity, and 
property have been interpreted to protect indigenous peoples’ 
claims to a distinctive communal, religious, and cultural 
association with ancestral land.  Indeed, indigenous peoples’ 
claims to ownership, occupancy, use, and control of their 
traditional lands and resources are recognized as human rights.78  
More broadly, the recently adopted United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which draws upon the 
development of human rights jurisprudence with respect to 
indigenous peoples, reflects a more comprehensive translation of 
indigenous peoples’ claims into recognizable rights.79 
3.3. Participation in Human Rights Norm-Building and Decision-
Making Processes 
Communities of indigenous peoples have primarily 
participated in international lawmaking within the human rights 
regime.  They have sought to translate their claims into 
recognizable human rights through participation in informal and 
formal norm-building and decision-making processes.80  Through 
 
determination in relation to indigenous peoples); Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous 
Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1170-76 (2008) (suggesting a re-definition 
of indigenous sovereignty based on the adoption of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).  See generally MAIVÂN C. LÂM, 
AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 51–62, 
123–35 (2000) (discussing the history and development of norms relevant to self-
determination claims and the application through the U.N. of these norms to 
indigenous peoples); Catherine J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination: 
Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 199 (1992) (addressing 
barriers regarding the recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination). 
78 See Miranda, supra note 8, at 447–54. 
79 See UNDRIP, supra note 65, at pmbl.  The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples “is a further important step forward for the recognition, 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples and 
in the development of relevant activities of the United Nations system in this 
field.”  Id.  The Declaration affirms “that indigenous individuals are entitled 
without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and 
that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their 
existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.”  Id. 
80 Indigenous peoples’ participation in international lawmaking has been 
dynamic and fluid, and therefore, cannot be appropriately presented in a 
chronological timeline nor dissected into a narrative of events that necessarily 
build upon each other in a particular order.  Accordingly, this Article provides an 
account of indigenous peoples’ participation by analyzing the primary informal 
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participation in such processes, indigenous peoples have 
contributed to the recognition of the legal category “indigenous 
peoples” and to the creation of a well-established body of 
international norms that specifically address indigenous peoples’ 
human rights. 
First, sub-national, identity-based communities have engaged 
in bottom-up resistance against affronts to their way of life through 
participation in informal norm-building processes.  These 
communities have formed, or engaged, transnational networks and 
non-governmental organizations dedicated to the production of 
knowledge and generation of norms regarding the recognition of a 
distinctive transnational indigenous identity and a derivative 
framework of indigenous rights.  Second, these communities have 
engaged in resistance against affronts to their way of life through 
participation in more formal, institutionalized, top-down 
structures that contribute to the development of norms and 
decision-making regarding indigenous peoples’ rights.  Ultimately, 
indigenous peoples’ participation in these informal and formal 
processes has contributed to the formulation of “hard” and “soft” 
law applicable to indigenous peoples.81  Both hard law, which 
traditionally encompasses binding treaty and customary 
international law, and soft law, which includes declarations and 
non-binding jurisprudence from human rights bodies, constitute 
sources of rights for indigenous peoples today. 
The activities of transnational networks and non-governmental 
organizations have contributed to indigenous peoples’ ability to 
participate, even if only informally or indirectly, in international 
identity-building and rights formulation.82  Transnational networks 
have been instrumental in creating such opportunities through the 
organization of transnational conferences.  Non-governmental 
organizations have similarly been involved in identity-building 
and rights-formulation through advocacy efforts.  
In the 1970s, indigenous peoples from around the world began 
to gather at transnational conferences aimed at addressing pressing 
 
and formal processes through which norm-building and decision-making 
regarding the scope of indigenous identity and rights has taken place. 
81 See Shelton, supra note 10, at 319–23 (distinguishing between “hard” and 
“soft” international law). 
82 See NIEZEN, supra note 56, at 9 (finding that indigenous peoples have been 
successful in forming transnational networks that pool resources and strategize 
for purposes of identity-building and norm-generation). 
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issues faced by indigenous peoples.  At such transnational 
conferences, indigenous communities and their leaders shared 
information regarding activities that affect their way of life, claims 
against states, and effective human rights advocacy strategies.  
Indigenous communities identified norms and values that could 
propel the recognition of a distinctive transnational indigenous 
identity and framework of rights responsive to their claims.  They 
debated the appropriate scope of such transnational indigenous 
identity and the substance of such rights. 
For example, in 1974, indigenous leaders from North America, 
Greenland, Colombia, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand 
met at a conference in Guyana that prompted the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, one of the first indigenous NGOs with official 
U.N. consultative status.83  The meeting consisted of determining 
details of the organization, such as the selection of delegates, 
accreditation of observers, and, saliently, the adoption of a 
definition of “indigenous peoples” for the purpose of determining 
delegate status at the proposed international conference.84 
Subsequent significant conferences included the International 
Non-Governmental Organization Conference on Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Peoples of the Americas,85 the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference,86 and the World Conference of 
Indigenous Peoples on Territory, Environment, and 
 
83 See Douglas Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, IWGIA Doc. No. 29 (1980), available at http://www.cwis.org 
/fwdp/International/wcipinfo.txt (providing a comprehensive account of the 
development of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples). 
84 See generally Sanders, supra note 83. 
85 See Comm. on Human Rights, Study of the Problem of Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.5 
(June 17, 1981) [hereinafter Declaration for Defense of Indigenous Nations] 
(proposal resulting from the conference).  See generally Rachel San Kronowitz et 
al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian 
Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 613-14 (1987). 
86 See ICC’s Beginning, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, 
http://inuitcircumpolar.com/section.php?ID=15&Lang=En&Nav=Section (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing the creation of the Inuit Circumpolar Council).  
See also Sara C. Aminzadeh, Note, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights 
Implications of Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231, 232 n.7 
(2007) (discussing the ICC petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights against the United States); Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), INUIT 
CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, http://inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?auto_slide=&ID 
=16&Lang=En&Parent_ID=&current_slide_num (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) 
(describing the goals and activities of the ICC). 
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Development.87  The International Nongovernmental Organization 
Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples of the 
Americas occurred in Geneva in 1977.88  This conference 
constituted the first major meeting in which representatives of 
indigenous groups were provided “the opportunity to express 
their views in an international forum.”89  The Conference served as 
a platform for the recognition of indigenous peoples under 
international law.90  It ultimately resulted in the adoption of a 
“Draft Declaration of Principles for the Defense of Indigenous 
Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere,” which was 
prepared by participating indigenous peoples.91 
Furthermore, in June 1977, Eben Hopson, Mayor of the North 
Slope Borough, Alaska and Inuit advocate, hosted the first Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference (“ICC”), for the purpose of uniting Inuits 
from various countries.92  At the conference, fifty-four delegates 
from Canada, Greenland, and Alaska agreed to found an 
organization to continue their collective work on an international 
basis.93  The ICC has subsequently developed into a major 
international organization representing 150,000 Inuits from Alaska, 
Canada, Greenland,  and Russia and holding Consultative Status II 
at the United Nations.94 
Moreover, The World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on 
Territory, Environment and Development, commonly referred to 
as the Kari-Oca meeting, was held in the outlying area of Rio de 
Janiero, Brazil in June 1992.95  The Conference centered on the role 
of indigenous peoples as part of the global community in the 
twenty-first Century.96  Delegates discussed and solidified 
 
87 See Ingrid Washinawatok, International Emergence: Twenty-One Years at the 
United Nations, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 41, 50 (1998) (describing the purpose and 
proceedings of the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on Territory, 
Environment, and Development). 
88 See Kronowitz et al., supra note 85, at 613–14 (describing the conference and 
“Declaration on Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples 
of the Western Hempisphere” that resulted from the conference). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Declaration for Defense of Indigenous Nations, supra note 85. 
92 See ICC’s Beginning, supra note 86 (describing the formation of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council). 
93 Id. 
94 See generally Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), supra note 86. 
95 Washinawatok, supra note 87, at 50. 
96 Id. 
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advocacy positions on a number of issues, including the use of 
nuclear material on indigenous lands, the destruction of 
indigenous ecosystems and natural resources, and the eradication 
of the principle of terra nullius.97 
Likewise, NGOs created to study, investigate, and promote 
indigenous peoples’ claims have also contributed to indigenous 
peoples’ ability to participate, whether informally or formally, in 
international norm-building and decision-making processes.  More 
specifically, indigenous peoples have assisted non-governmental 
organizations in the creation of reports regarding contemporary 
conditions of subordination, marginalization, and discrimination 
against indigenous communities in different parts of the world.  
They have further assisted such organizations in identifying 
indigenous norms and values that could serve as a platform for 
advocacy strategies that capitalize on the politics of difference for 
distinctive identity and rights recognition. 
There are a number of NGOs dedicated to studying and 
investigating indigenous peoples’ claims and violations of 
indigenous peoples’ human rights, including among others, the 
International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (“IWGIA”)98 
and El Consejo Indio de Sud America (“CISA”).99  Established in 
1968, IWGIA’s mission is to endorse indigenous peoples’ rights to 
self-determination, cultural integrity, and development based on 
indigenous peoples’ own values.100  One of the main undertakings 
of IWGIA is to ensure the promotion of indigenous issues and 
indigenous peoples’ participation in international and regional 
forums.101  CISA was founded in 1980 and possesses consultative 
 
97 Id. 
98 See generally IWGIA Mission Statement, INT’L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS 
AFF., http://www.iwgia.org/sw17673.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter 
IWGIA Mission Statement] (announcing, in its mission statement, the International 
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs’ commitment to indigenous peoples’ claims 
for self determination). 
99 See El Consejo Indio de Sud America, PUEBLO INDIO, http://www.puebloindio 
.org/CISA/cisa.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter CISA] (surveying 
CISA’s work and commitment to ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples); see 
also Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International 
Norm, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 127, 165 (1991) (describing CISA as one of “[t]he most 
vocal organizations” and briefly relating its operations “at the domestic, regional 
and international level . . . to further indigenous causes”). 
100 See IWGIA Mission Statement, supra note 98 (stating that the International 
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs works to advance indigenous peoples’ claims 
to self-determination). 
101 Id. 
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status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council.102  CISA’s 
mission is to promote respect for indigenous peoples’ right to life, 
justice, development, peace, and autonomy.103  To that end, CISA 
coordinates activities that promote the exchange of knowledge, 
experiences, and perspectives between indigenous peoples in order 
to improve their welfare.104 
In turn, NGOs have the ability to participate in more formal 
norm-generation and decision-making forums.  NGOs that possess 
consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council are 
entitled to attend and contribute to a wide range of international 
and inter-governmental conferences that often involve human 
rights standard-setting.105  While local indigenous communities 
may directly engage in more formal avenues of participation 
offered by United Nations institutional forums, NGOs also have 
the potential to engage such avenues.  NGOs participate in the 
activities of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues as well as specialized working groups aimed at standard-
setting activities that impact indigenous peoples.  NGOs also assist 
indigenous peoples in filing petitions before human rights treaty 
compliance bodies, including the Committee on Human Rights106 
and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.107  
Furthermore, NGOs have the ability to petition the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.108 
 
102 See generally CISA, supra note 99. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See NGO Branch, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS (Oct. 30, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/ (explaining the process by which 
NGOs can attain consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council). 
106 See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (“Subject to the provisions of article 1, 
individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated in the Covenant have 
been violated and who have exhausted all available domestic remedies may 
submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration.”). 
107 See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 14, Dec. 21, 1965, G.A. Res 2106A, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered 
into force Jan. 4, 1969) (granting individuals and groups the right to make claims 
against a state party to the Convention). 
108 See American Convention, supra note 76, art. 44 (“Any person or group of 
persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more 
member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission 
containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State 
Party.”). 
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In sum, through transnational conferences, leaders and 
representatives of indigenous communities have debated and 
solidified the creation of a transnational indigenous identity.  They 
have additionally shared on-the-ground perspectives, identified 
core normative values shared by indigenous communities, and 
strategized routes for further advocacy.  Moreover, indigenous 
peoples have contributed to NGOs’ production of knowledge 
regarding the continued subordination and marginalization of 
indigenous communities and the design of advocacy strategies.  
Indigenous peoples, whether independently as local 
communities or through engagement with NGOs, have 
additionally participated in international lawmaking through 
formal forums established by international organizations.  Through 
their participation in these forums, indigenous peoples have 
contributed to the production of “hard” and “soft” international 
law regarding indigenous peoples’ rights.  While only hard law 
bears the emblem of binding authority, soft law nonetheless shapes 
an understanding of indigenous peoples’ international rights. 
With respect to the production of “hard law,” indigenous 
peoples participated, albeit in a limited manner, in the 
International Labour Organization’s (“ILO”) design of ILO 
Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries.  Although the ILO is not an international 
body strictly within the human rights regime, the ILO’s work has 
impacted the recognition and development of indigenous peoples’ 
human rights.  In the context of “soft-law,” indigenous peoples 
have contributed to the standard-setting work of the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, United Nations 
working groups dedicated to addressing indigenous peoples’ 
issues and rights, human rights treaty compliance bodies, and 
regional human rights commissions and courts. 
As an initial matter, indigenous peoples played a limited 
participatory role in the constitution of ILO Convention 169 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, which revised ILO Convention 107 Concerning the 
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries.109  While the 
lack of avenues for indigenous peoples’ meaningful participation 
 
109 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 291–331 (giving a thorough account 
of the processes leading to the revision of ILO Convention 107 and resulting in the 
creation of ILO Convention 169). 
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garnered much criticism, indigenous peoples’ limited participation 
nevertheless constituted an unprecedented entry into the sphere of 
hard law-making.  Additionally, although the crafting of ILO 
Convention 169 was plagued with controversy110 and was initially 
perceived by a number of indigenous peoples and NGOs as a 
limiting document that failed to strongly reject racist policies 
toward indigenous peoples and to promote modern notions of self-
determination, it remains a source of binding obligations on states 
regarding their treatment of indigenous peoples.  Despite the 
controversy surrounding its creation, 111 ILO Convention 169 has 
come to be regarded as a document reflecting the progression from 
the assimilationist and integrationist policies represented in ILO 
Convention 107. 
Even though at the time such revision process was undertaken 
there was already a robust, transnational indigenous peoples 
movement and the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations  had been established, indigenous peoples’ 
participation in the crafting of ILO Convention 169 was 
constrained.  Significantly, the structure of the ILO’s decision-
making process did not account for the involvement of non-state 
actors other than employers and workers.112  Moreover, because 
the revision process was largely driven by the ILO’s desire to 
remain in an international leadership role regarding indigenous 
peoples’ affairs,113 “there was never a perception that serious 
consensus-building with the international indigenous movement 
concerning the need (or scope) of the revision was required.”114  
 
110 See id. at 291 (“Issues concerning the ILO’s legitimacy in retaking the lead 
in international action on indigenous peoples and the participation of indigenous 
peoples themselves in this process, constitute[d] the convention’s ‘original sin,’ 
which explains many of the complex reactions that the instrument still 
engenders.”). 
111 See Robin M. Maher & David Weissbrodt, The 41st Session of the U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 12 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 290, 323 (1990) (describing indigenous peoples’ controversial exit from a 
meeting of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations in response to the 
introduction of ILO Convention 169 by the ILO representative). 
112 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 312 (emphasizing that the 
institutional culture of the ILO limited the participation of non-governmental 
actors to its constituents).  Interestingly, the ILO is the only international 
organization that possesses a tripartite governance structure consisting of states 
and non-state actors, namely, employers and workers.  Id. 
113 See id. at 293 (discussing the ILO’s strategy to preserve its sphere of 
influence as an international leader). 
114 Id. at 313. 
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Nevertheless, during the drafting of ILO Convention 169 from 
1986–1989, some indigenous peoples’ organizations were 
permitted to participate indirectly through the attainment of 
“observer status,” and indigenous peoples also participated 
directly in discussions either as representatives of employers’ or 
workers’ organizations.115 
More specifically, the first forum of discussion for revisions to 
ILO Convention 107 occurred in a 1986 Meeting of Experts.116  
While this meeting produced a consensus that the overarching 
integrationist policy of ILO Convention 107 should be rejected, it 
failed to produce an alternate overarching policy for guiding the 
revision process culminating in ILO Convention 169.117  A 
representative from the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and 
a representative from Survival International, international NGOs 
advocating on behalf of indigenous peoples, were invited to 
participate in the meeting as observers.118  Those representatives 
proposed that self-determination should serve as an umbrella 
principle for the elaboration of particularized rights in ILO 
Convention 169.119  While the experts present at the meeting agreed 
with the indigenous peoples’ representatives, the ILO Secretariat 
ultimately considered a discussion of self-determination outside 
the scope of the “technical” revision process.120  This meeting 
engendered controversy regarding the limited channels of 
participation, and impact of, indigenous peoples in the 
development of ILO Convention 169.  It ultimately concluded with 
a request that the ILO “‘take all possible measures to ensure the 
participation of indigenous and tribal representatives in the 
process leading to the revision of . . . Convention [No 107].’”121 
Thereafter, efforts included attendance by the ILO official 
responsible for the revision process at the U.N. Working Group on 
 
115 Id. at 314–16. 
116 Id. at 295. 
117 See id. at 296–97.  Rather, the ILO revision processes drew mainly from the 
discourse of development “with its emphasis on ‘participatory development’ or 
‘ethnodevelopment.’”  Id. at 299. 
118 Id. at 313 n.118. 
119 Id. at 296. 
120 Id. at 293.  Rodriguez-Piñero proposes that “[i]n this way, the eventual UN 
Declaration on indigenous rights should articulate the ‘highest ideals and 
maximum aspirations of indigenous peoples,’ while the ILO had a ‘more technical 
but no less important task.’”  Id. 
121 Id. at 314. 
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Indigenous Populations’ annual sessions and the granting of 
“observer status” to several NGOs representative of indigenous 
peoples’ interests.122  While the ILO official encouraged indigenous 
peoples to support the revision process during the U.N. Working 
Group’s annual sessions, there was not a meaningful consultation 
process with indigenous peoples regarding the substantive scope 
of the revisions.123  The most significant form of participation by 
indigenous peoples occurred indirectly through the involvement of 
several NGOs that were granted “observer status” at various ILO 
meetings and conferences.124  Even this form of participation, 
however, “provide[d] a ‘limited opportunity . . . to consult directly 
the representatives [of] the groups concerned.’”125  The ILO Office 
did circulate written comments from indigenous peoples’ 
organizations during Conference sessions and indigenous peoples’ 
concerns and demands were reflected in various comments 
submitted by governments or workers in response to the Office’s 
preparatory questionnaire.126  Nevertheless, while indigenous 
peoples’ participation in the revision of ILO Convention 107 
occurred within the existing structural and procedural constraints 
of the ILO framework, “the level of participation allowed in the 
drafting of a legally-binding convention has been 
unmatched . . . .”127 
Ultimately, scholars have proposed that core normative 
precepts expressed in ILO Convention 169 reflect a crystallization 
of customary international law regarding indigenous peoples’ 
rights,128 and the Convention has been referenced in this context  
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.129  Indeed, despite 
its controversial origins, ILO Convention 169 became a catalyst for 
 
122 Id. at 313. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 314. 
125 Id. at 315. 
126 Id. at 316. 
127 Id. at 319. 
128 See Anaya, supra note 77, at 9–10; Anaya & Williams, supra note 38, at 53–
54. 
129 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Awas Tingni Case] 
(referencing the precepts found in ILO Convention 169 as significant to 
interpreting the scope and meaning of the term “property” in the American 
Convention). 
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legislative and constitutional reforms in ratifying states130 as well 
as for further developments regarding a body of customary 
international law specific to indigenous peoples. 
Second, indigenous peoples have also contributed to the 
production of “soft” international law through advocacy before 
formal, institutional bodies charged with norm-generation and 
decision-making.  Specifically, they have channeled their 
contributions through advocacy before United Nations 
institutional bodies, human rights treaty compliance bodies, and 
human rights commissions and courts.  Advocacy before these 
bodies has enabled indigenous peoples to draw upon and upload 
the knowledge produced by transnational networks and NGOs 
regarding indigenous peoples’ subordination, marginalization, and 
discrimination as well as the core normative precepts and values 
arguably representative of indigenous distinctiveness. 
For example, indigenous peoples have participated in United 
Nations institutional forums such as the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations.  In 2000, the United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was established to 
give indigenous peoples a greater voice within the U.N. system.131  
The Permanent Forum is composed of sixteen members with 
expertise on indigenous issues, eight of which are nominated by 
governments and elected by the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (“ECOSOC”), and eight of which are appointed by 
ECOSOC on the basis of consultation with indigenous peoples’ 
organizations.132  The eight members appointed by ECOSOC on the 
 
130 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 325–28 (discussing the importance 
of ILO Convention 169 in the development of both domestic and international 
laws and practices that recognize the rights of indigenous peoples). 
131 See S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The 
Move Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 53–54 (2004) 
(“The U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which was established to 
give indigenous peoples a greater voice within the U.N. system, and which is 
constituted in part by indigenous persons, is now perhaps the principle 
manifestation of general acceptance of indigenous participation within relevant 
international spheres.”); About Us/Mandate, U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON 
INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/about_us.html 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing the purpose and role of the Permanent 
Forum and the group’s mandate). 
132 Establishment of a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, E.S.C. Res. 
2000/22, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2000/22 (July 28, 2000), available at http://www.un-
documents.net/e2000r22.htm.  More specifically, in determining which eight 
members should be appointed by ECOSOC on the basis of consultation with 
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basis of consultation with indigenous peoples’ organizations 
represent the following seven socio-cultural regions: Africa; Asia; 
Central and South America and the Caribbean; the Arctic; Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation, Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia; North America; and the Pacific—with one 
additional rotating seat among the three first listed above.133  
Accordingly, indigenous peoples are broadly represented and 
possess permanent and official participation capabilities. 
More specifically, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
is involved in the following activities: (1) discussing indigenous 
issues within the mandate of ECOSOC relating to economic and 
social development, culture, environment, education, health and 
human rights; (2) giving advice to ECOSOC on economic and 
social issues as they relate to indigenous peoples; (3) coordinating, 
as part of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, the implementation of the Second Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples; (4) organizing expert meetings as approved by 
ECOSOC; and (5) submitting annual reports to ECOSOC including 
recommendations and matters for consideration by the United 
Nations system.134 
In an effort to discuss indigenous issues, the Permanent Forum 
holds an annual conference each year during which input on 
thematic topics related to indigenous peoples’ concerns and rights 
is received from indigenous participants.135  Through such 
gatherings, indigenous peoples and their representative bodies 
have had opportunities to share their local experiences and to 
advocate for redress.  These annual conferences culminate in a 
report that is presented to ECOSOC.  Therefore, through its 
activities, the Permanent Forum raises awareness of indigenous 
 
indigenous peoples’ organizations, ECOSOC takes into account “the diversity and 
geographical distribution of the indigenous people of the world as well as the 
principles of transparency, representativity and equal opportunity for all 
indigenous people, including internal processes, when appropriate, and local 
indigenous consultation processes . . . .”  Id. para. 1. 
133 Structure within ECOSOC, U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/structure.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2010). 
134 Matrix on United Nations Mechanisms and Bodies on Indigenous Peoples, U.N. 
ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Dec. 6–7, 2007, U.N. Doc. 
IMWGIP/2007/CRP.1 (2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues 
/indigenous/docs/informal/crp-1-e.doc. [hereinafter U.N. Matrix]. 
135 See Coulter, International Human Rights Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 578–
79. 
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issues and offers avenues for norm-generation regarding 
transnational indigenous identity and indigenous rights.136 
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which was 
established in 1982 as a subsidiary body of ECOSOC and abolished 
in 2007, performed the mandate of dealing exclusively with 
problems concerning observance of indigenous peoples’ rights 
around the world.137  During its existence, the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations: 
[P]repared thematic studies on indigenous peoples’ human 
rights . . . discussed contemporary human rights issues 
relating to indigenous peoples .  .  . presented annual report 
to [the former Sub-Commission on Human Rights] 
summarizing discussions and making recommendations . . . 
[and] elaborated standards and guidelines in particular the 
draft of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples[.]138 
 
136 Id. 
137 See Working Group on Indigenous Populations, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous 
/groups/groups-01.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (outlining the resolutions and 
actions of the Working Group).  More specifically, the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations was charged with “reviewing developments pertaining to 
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous populations” and giving “special attention to the evolution of 
standards concerning the rights of indigenous populations [while] taking into 
account . . . both the similarities and the differences in the situations and 
aspirations of indigenous populations throughout the world.”  U.N. Matrix, supra 
note 134.  The Working Group on Indigenous Populations “became directionless” 
after the establishment of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2002 and, 
therefore, was abolished in 2007.  Informal Meeting to Discuss the Most Appropriate 
Mechanisms to Continue the Work of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Dec. 6–7, 2007, U.N. Doc. 
No. IMWGIP/2007/CRP.9 (2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english 
/issues/indigenous/docs /informal/crp.9.doc. 
138 U.N. Matrix, supra note 134.  For an overview of the procedures enabling 
the participation of indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Working Group’s 
elaboration of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, see 
Programme of Activities for the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous 
People, G.A. Res. 50/157, Annex pt. B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/157 (Feb. 29, 1996), 
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/ares50-157.htm.  
Ultimately, through their participation in the Working Group, more than 100 
indigenous organizations participated in the Declaration’s drafting process.  See 
generally About UNPFII, U.N. PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/history.html (last visited Oct. 30, 
2010). 
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Although the participation of indigenous peoples was restricted to 
an informal consultative status and limited to representatives of 
indigenous NGOs, the Working Group actively solicited the 
participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives in their 
information-seeking, policy-shaping, and standard-setting work.139  
The annual sessions of the Working Group functioned as an open 
forum that enabled indigenous peoples to present their grievances 
against national governments and to participate, even if only 
indirectly, in the Working Group’s development of standards 
specific to indigenous peoples.140  Prior to being abolished, the 
Working Group prompted the General Assembly to adopt a 
resolution in January of 2005 for the commencement of the 
“Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous 
Peoples.”141  This resolution specifically encourages indigenous 
peoples’ further participation in designing the substantive content 
 
139 Official membership in the Working Group was limited to five human 
rights experts that were members of the former Sub-Commission on Human 
Rights.  See Lâm, supra note 13, at 620 (“Culturally, socially, and professionally, 
Working Group members generally [had] far more in common with 
representatives of states and NGOs than they [did] with indigenous 
spokespersons.  For example, not a single indigenous lawyer, [despite the fact 
that] there [were] many the U.N. could have chosen, s[a]t on the Working 
Group.”).  However, governments, United Nations bodies, non-governmental 
organizations, and representatives of indigenous peoples, communities, and 
organizations were granted observer status.  U.N. Matrix, supra note 134.  
Indigenous peoples’ participation in the Working Group was most evident 
through the drafting process of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.  Erica-Irene A. Daes, Chairperson/Rapporteur of the Working Group, 
described how the legislative history of the Draft Declaration demonstrated the 
“important and substantive contributions . . . made by indigenous people 
themselves . . . .  The drafts of principles . . . were circulated to indigenous peoples 
and governments for written comments and suggestions each year from 1989 to 
1992.”  Erica-Irene A. Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples Under the Auspices of the 
United Nations-Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 7 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 493, 494–99 (1995). 
140 As a means of fostering the participation of indigenous peoples at such 
annual sessions, the Working Group established a fund to subsidize the costs of 
attendance by indigenous peoples’ representatives.  See U.N. Secretary-General, 
United Nations Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations, Rep. of the Econ. and Soc. 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/43/706, para. 2 (Oct. 14, 1988) (depicting the makeup of the 
Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations, as well as its board, method for 
raising funds, and the funds received). 
141 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Programme of Action for the 
Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/60/270 (Aug. 18, 2005). 
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of international law and in decision-making processes that directly, 
or indirectly, impact their way of life.142 
The most recent standard-setting document, the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
represents over twenty years of work that began in the United 
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1985 and 
was subsequently concluded by the Working Group on the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.143  Notably, 
during the drafting process, draft principles and working papers 
were circulated to indigenous peoples and governments for 
 
142 Specifically, the Secretary-General’s draft programme of action provides: 
The five objectives suggested for the Decade are as follows: (i) Promoting 
non-discrimination and inclusion of indigenous peoples in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of international, regional and national 
processes regarding laws, policies, resources, programmes and projects; 
(ii) Promoting full and effective participation of indigenous peoples in 
decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lifestyles, traditional 
lands and territories, their cultural integrity as indigenous peoples with 
collective rights or any other aspect of their lives, considering the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent. 
Id. para. 9 (emphasis added). 
It is recommended that cooperation be developed with the Working 
Group on the Rights of Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with a view 
to increasing the participation of indigenous peoples from Africa in the 
implementation of the Second Decade Programme of Action and to 
enhancing the understanding of indigenous issues in Africa. 
Id. para. 48. 
It is recommended that Governments should support and broaden the 
mandate of existing national machineries for the promotion of equal 
rights and prevention of discrimination, so that they will include 
promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples. Legal centres could be 
established by national authorities to inform and assist indigenous 
people regarding national and international legislation on human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, to carry out activities for protecting those 
rights and freedoms and to promote the capacity-building and 
participation of indigenous peoples. 
Id. para. 55. 
It is recommended that programmes and projects planned on traditional 
indigenous territories or otherwise affecting the situation of indigenous 
peoples should foresee and respect the full and meaningful participation 
of indigenous peoples. 
Id. para. 62. 
143 See generally UNDRIP, supra note 65. 
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written comments and suggestions.144  These working groups 
actively solicited the participation of indigenous peoples in the 
drafting of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.  The former chairperson of the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations hailed the “substantive contributions 
made by indigenous peoples” because, through every step of its 
development, indigenous peoples were deeply involved in 
discussions and negotiations with states.145  The Declaration serves 
a bill of rights for indigenous peoples and covers rights related to 
the preservation of cultural identity,146 the protection of traditional 
lands and resources,147 and the right to pursue development in 
keeping with a community’s own needs and aspirations.148 
Furthermore, indigenous peoples have shared their normative 
perspectives with human rights treaty compliance bodies such as 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the 
Human Rights Committee.  For example, indigenous organizations 
have been given the opportunity to submit written reports and to 
present short formal briefings to the Human Rights Committee as a 
means of assisting the Committee in its review of state 
compliance.149  Indigenous peoples have also engaged complaint 
procedures when available, and through such advocacy, have 
contributed to the Committee’s nuanced interpretation of rights in 
the context of indigenous claims.150 
Moreover, indigenous peoples have shared their normative 
perspectives with the Inter-American Commission and Court.  
They have sought recourse before these bodies, and through their 
advocacy, have contributed to the development of jurisprudence 
that specifically addresses indigenous claims.151 
 
144 Daes, supra note 139, at 494–99. 
145 Id. 
146 E.g., UNDRIP, supra note 65, arts. 8, 9, 11–16, 31, 33–35. 
147 E.g., id. arts. 8(2)(b), 10, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29(1)–(2), 30, 32. 
148 E.g., id. arts. 3, 4, 18, 19, 20, 23, 32. 
149 Coulter, International Human Rights Mechanisms, supra note 13, at 581. 
150 See, e.g., Länsmann v. Finland, Views, Human Rights Comm., 52d Sess., 
No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994); Ominayak, Chief of 
the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm., 38th Sess., No. 
267/1984, U.N. GOAR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, (Vol. 2), U.N. Doc. A/45/40, 
Annex IX (1990); Lovelace v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm., No. 24/1977, 
U.N. GOAR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, Annex XVIII, at 166 
(1981). 
151 See, e.g., Aboriginal Cmty. of Lhaka Honhat v. Argentina, Petition 12.094, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 78/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 
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3.4. Contributions to the Design of a Transnational Indigenous 
Identity and the Substantive Contours of Indigenous Rights 
Through participation in such informal and formal norm-
building and decision-making processes, indigenous peoples have 
contributed to the substantive design of the legal category 
“indigenous peoples” and to the creation of a well-established 
body of international human rights specific to indigenous peoples.  
These processes have offered indigenous peoples opportunities to 
share on-the-ground experiences and to articulate norms and 
values that highlight distinctive attributes of their  communities—
such as norms of communal association and existence, as well as 
norms of cultural and religious ties to ancestral lands and 
resources.  Indigenous peoples have been able to engage in an 
uploading of such norms as a means of triggering, and re-
formulating, the application of human rights. 
First, indigenous peoples’ substantive contributions are evident 
with respect to the legal category termed “indigenous peoples.”  
Indigenous peoples needed to create a transnational legal identity 
in order to trigger the recognition or application of particularized 
rights.  Of course, just like any legal category capable of 
redistributing political or economic capital, the substantive scope 
of such category was not produced without controversy.152  
 
(2007), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/ARGENTINA 
.12094eng.htm; Cmtys. in Alcantara v. Brazil, Petition 555-01, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R. Report No. 83/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2006eng/BRAZIL.555.01eng.htm; Dann v. 
United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 75/02, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.org 
/annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm; Enxet-Lâmenxay & Kayleyphapopyet 
(Riachito) Indigenous Cmtys. v. Paraguay, Case 11.713, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 90/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 6 (1999), available at http://www 
.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Friendly/Paraguay11.713.htm; Garifuna Cmty. of 
Cayos Cochinos v. Honduras, Petition 1118-03, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 39/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.130, doc. 22 rev. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2007eng/Honduras1118.03eng.htm; The Kalina 
& Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Petition 198-07, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 39/07, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.130, doc. 22 rev. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2007eng/Suriname198.07eng.htm; Yanomami 
v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 12/85, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985), available at http://www.cidh.org 
/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm. 
152 See generally Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: 
A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414 (1998) 
(discussing definitions of “indigenous peoples” found in texts by the U.N., ILO, 
and the World Bank and analyzing whether the legal category of “indigenous 
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Pressing questions arose: Who exactly could be considered 
“indigenous?”  Who exactly could be considered a distinct 
“people?”  Could a collective identity be the source of collective 
rights?  The construction of a transnational indigenous peoples’ 
identity ultimately reflects a recognition of inherent difference 
from dominant religious, cultural, political, and associational 
structures.153  Indeed, claims by indigenous peoples that are tied to 
 
peoples” should apply in the context of Asia); Will Kymlicka, The 
Internationalization of Minority Rights, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1 (2008) (describing the 
U.N.’s distinction between minorities and indigenous peoples and noting that the 
U.N. views the “crucial feature of indigenous peoples, which distinguishes them 
from minorities in general, [as] their strong attachment to a traditional territory 
that they view as their historic homeland”); Jeremy Waldron, Indigeneity? First 
Peoples and Last Occupancy, 1 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 55 (2003) (describing varying 
definitions of “indigeneity,” including: first occupancy, which defines 
“indigenous peoples” as “the descendants of the first human inhabitants of a 
land,” and prior occupancy, which defines “indigenous peoples” as the 
“descendants of those who inhabited the land at the time of European 
colonization”).  The scope and impact of an “indigenous peoples” category under 
international law continues to be debated.  See John R. Crook, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 185, 211–
13 (2007) (describing the objections of the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand to the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, particularly 
the absence of a “scope of application” or definition of “indigenous peoples,” 
since “separatist or minority groups, with traditional connections to the territory 
where they live—in all regions of the globe—could seek to exploit this declaration 
to claim the right to self-determination, including exclusive control of their 
territorial resources”). 
153 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 340.  Luis Rodríguez-Piñero has 
instructively observed the following regarding the development of an 
“indigenous peoples” category under international law: 
[T]he ‘anthropological’ definition of indigenousness articulated in the 
1957 ILO instruments has, ironically, the virtue of putting the emphasis 
on the cultural distinctiveness of indigenous societies and the 
maintenance of their social, legal, and political institutions as the 
fundamental defining criterion, and depicting history as a relevant factor 
in explaining indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness vis-à-vis the dominant 
societies now encapsulating them—but not as the ultimate source of 
indigenous rights .  .  .  . 
Indigenous peoples thus emerged in modern international law as a result 
of their subjectivization by social sciences.  But this subjectivization 
provided the conditions for the possible re-appropriation of this category 
as a vehicle of resistance for the subjects it constructed.  In this respect, 
the emergence of the modern regime on indigenous rights was the result 
of the increasing mobilization of the international indigenous movement 
constituting a privileged example of what Foucault conceptualized as the 
‘tactical polyvalence of discourses’: namely, the turning of a disciplining 
discourse into a liberating discourse by the same social groups subject to 
and constructed by that disciplining.   
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religious, cultural, political, and associational differences have 
become more commonplace than claims of geographical 
difference.154 
Indigenous peoples have contributed to this legal category in 
three primary ways: (1) determining the substantive scope of the 
term “indigenous”; (2) determining the substantive scope of the 
term “peoples”; and (3) perpetuating an open-ended meaning 
rather than a specifically tailored definition.  The suggestion here is 
that there has been a significant appropriation of meaning by 
indigenous peoples themselves.  Certainly, the particularities of 
such appropriation by indigenous peoples are not devoid of debate 
or lack of consensus. 
This referential category became a salient part of international 
discourse during the 1980s.155  Through their participation in norm-
generating and decision-making processes, indigenous peoples 
appropriated the term “indigenous” as a means of distinguishing 
their claims from those of groups that could be classified under 
international law as “minorities.”156  The acknowledgement and 
endurance of the term “indigenous” reflects an incorporation of 
indigenous communities’ core normative precepts.  It strategically 
marks differences between groups that could be considered 
“indigenous” and other groups that may bear similar indicia of 
colonization, subordination, and marginalization.157  The difference 
marker is an asserted distinctiveness in terms of religious, cultural, 
political, and associational structures.158  In particular, such 
 
Id. 
154 See NIEZEN, supra note 56, at 6.  Beyond its existence as a constructed legal 
category, the term “indigenous peoples” does have traction as a reference point 
and symbol for indigenous communities with respect to their shared experiences. 
Today, the term is both a fragile legal concept and the indefinite, 
unachievable sum of the historical and personal experiences of those 
gathered in a room who share, at the very least, the notion that they have 
all been oppressed in similar ways for similar motives by similar state 
and corporate entities. 
Id. at 4. 
155 Id. at 2–3. 
156 See Kymlicka, supra note 152, at 4 (referencing the U.N. Working Group on 
Minorities and Working Group on Indigenous Populations’ explanation that 
“indigenous peoples,” as opposed to “minorities,” seek “institutional 
separateness,” the assertion of “collective rights,” and “self-government”). 
157 Id. 
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distinctiveness is highlighted in the context of indigenous peoples’ 
communal, religious, and cultural ties to their ancestral lands and 
resources.159 
Through their participation, indigenous peoples have also 
appropriated the term “peoples.”  During the ILO process of 
revising ILO Convention 107, state representatives particularly 
contested references to the term “peoples.”160  However, during the 
drafting of ILO Convention 169, indigenous peoples advocated for 
use of the term “peoples” versus “populations” because the term 
“peoples” represented a sense of collective identity shared by such 
communities.161  State governments, however, objected to the term 
“peoples” because it was tied to the concept of self-determination 
under the international law of decolonization, which allowed for 
independent statehood.162  In the context of ILO Convention 169, 
the debate resulted in compromise: the term “peoples” was 
adopted with the caveat that it would not trigger the rights 
traditionally accorded to “peoples” under international law.163 
Nevertheless, use of the term “peoples” today reflects the 
original intent of many indigenous advocates: it reflects core 
 
158 See also Amelia Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, Who is Indigenous?: Indigenous 
Rights Globally, in Africa, and Among the San in Botswana, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
93, 106 (2009) (noting that while defining who constitutes indigenous peoples is a 
complex and difficult question, common usage generally refers to a subset of 
culturally distinct persons who share a similar background, religion, sense of 
kinship and ties to ancestral lands). 
159 See Kymlicka, supra note 152, at 4 (quoting Erica-Irene Daes’s description 
of the “ideal” indigenous group as one that is aboriginal to the land they currently 
occupy, perpetuating a distinct cultural, social, and political identity); U.N. Econ. 
& Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of 
Human Rights, Working Paper on the Relationship and Distinction Between the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to Minorities and those of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10 (July 19, 2000) (prepared by Asbjorn Eide & Erica-Irene 
Daes), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol 
%29/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2000.10.En?Opendocument (asserting that “rights to land and 
natural resources” are “core elements” in defining the rights of “indigenous 
peoples,” whereas they do not pertain to “minorities”). 
160 See ANAYA, supra note 4, at 59–60 (noting that state governments contested 
using the term “peoples” to identify the beneficiaries of ILO Convention No. 169 
because of its connection with the dotrine of self-determination under 
international law, “which in turn has been associated with a right of independent 
statehood”). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 See RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 317 (noting that “sensitive issues 
such as the compromise over the term ‘peoples’ . . . were negotiated in private, in 
closed-door sessions from which indigenous representatives were barred”). 
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normative values of collective identity and continued communal 
existence and survival.  The substantive scope of the term has been 
differentiated from its remedial prescriptions under the 
international law of decolonization: constituting an indigenous 
“peoples” need not necessarily effectuate the remedial prescription 
of independent statehood.164  Rather, an indigenous community 
may exercise self-determination collectively as a matter of human 
rights.  In this context, the exercise of self-determination is much 
more fluid and context-specific; it ranges from the exercise of 
internal, communal decision-making to territorial secession.165  
What is ultimately being protected through the right to self-
determination is indigenous peoples’ way of life, including the 
range of indigenous peoples’ religious, cultural, political, and 
associational orders and practices. 
Finally, indigenous peoples have advocated for purposeful 
ambiguity in the application of the “indigenous peoples” 
category.166  Whether the category should be subject to a tailored 
definition that specifies circumstances of applicability has been the 
subject of debate.167  Some indigenous advocates have proposed 
that leaving the category purposefully ambiguous reflects 
indigenous peoples’ communal ability to self-identify and 
preserves respect for such determinations.168  Ultimately, reference 
to the contemporary “indigenous peoples” category presently 
appears in binding conventions,169 standard-setting documents,170 
 
164 See ANAYA, supra note 4, at 60 (discussing the comprise to use the term 
“peoples” to indentify the beneficiaries of ILO Convention 169 with the caveat 
that a provision be added so that such term would not confer a right of 
independent statehood). 
165 See generally id. at 97–184 (discussing the principle of self-determination ). 
166 See NIEZEN, supra note 56, at 18 (proposing that “[i]ndigenous delegates to 
international meetings have often expressed the idea that a precise, legal 
definition of the term ‘indigenous’ would impose standards or conditions for 
participation in human rights processes that would be prejudicial to their 
interests”). 
167 See Wiessner, supra note 38, at 110–15 (discussing the debate over whether 
the category “indigenous people” should reflect a more flexible standard and if 
the absence of a formal definition is desirable); Karin Lehmann, To Define or To 
Not Define—The Definitional Debate Revisited, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 509 (2007) 
(presenting the arguments for and against creating a definition, and examining 
the difficulties inherent in the process of defining “indigenous peoples”). 
168 See ANAYA, supra note 4, at 60 (noting that use of the term “peoples” did 
not “limit the meaning of the term”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 See, e.g., ILO Convention 169, supra note 54, at 1384, pmbl. 
(“Considering . . . developments in the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
MIRANDA.DOC 11/23/2010  3:57 PM 
248 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
reports of various human rights treaty compliance bodies,171 and in 
the decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights172 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.173  
Whether in these or additional documents, the term bears indicia 
of what indigenous peoples have identified as their own core 
norms and values.  It serves as a point of departure for the 
triggering of indigenous peoples’ human rights. 
 
in all regions of the world . . . and . . . [r]ecognising the aspirations of these 
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic 
development . . . .”). 
170 See, e.g., Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 1333rd mtg., 95th sess., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, 
doc. 6 (1997), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/chap.4.htm 
(revising  the scope of the declaration to indigenous peoples); UNDRIP, supra note 
65, pmbl. (recognizing and reaffirming “the urgent need to respect and promote 
the inherent rights of indigenous peoples”).  For a current record of the status of 
the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, see 
Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People, PERM. COUNCIL OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/consejo 
/CAJP/Indigenous%20documents.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
171 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-
Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards 
Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People, 14th sess., July 29–Aug. 2, 1996, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (recommending that a fair-
minded body be entrusted to implement a declaration of indigenous peoples’ 
rights); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on 
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of Standards Concerning the 
Rights of Indigenous People – New Developments and General Discussion of 
Future Action, 13th sess., July 24–28, 1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 
/AC.4/1995/3 (June 21, 1995) (noting that “historically speaking, indigenous 
peoples have suffered from definitions imposed by others” and providing that the 
objective and subjective criteria identified by Martinez Cobo in his Study of the 
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, “are sufficient to 
determine whether a person or a community is indigenous or not”); Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Prot. of 
Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: 
Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, para. 379, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (March 1987) (by José R. Martinez Cobo) 
(providing a preliminary, working analysis of the concept of indigenous peoples 
and commenting that “[i]ndigenous communities, peoples and nations are those 
which [have] a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies 
that developed on their territories”). 
172 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 151 (citing various petitions by indigenous 
peoples to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). 
173 See generally Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001) (involving a petition by 
indigenous communities to enjoin construction and logging “exploitation” on 
indigenous lands). 
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Second, indigenous peoples have also contributed 
substantively to the creation of a well-established body of 
indigenous peoples’ international human rights.  Indigenous 
peoples have been able to translate contemporary claims into 
human rights through their engagement of human rights 
discourse.174  They have participated in informal and formal norm-
generating and decision-making processes that impact the 
substantive contours of human rights.175 
More specifically, there are two related veins in which an 
acknowledgement of indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness serves to 
translate indigenous peoples’ claims into human rights.  In one 
vein, indigenous peoples’ distinctive attributes are joined with 
precepts of non-discrimination as a basis for recognizing 
indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination and other rights 
necessary to otherwise protect the survival and flourishing of 
indigenous peoples’ way of life.176  Examples of such particularized 
rights include rights to maintain religious and cultural traditions, 
rights to maintain distinct governance structures, and rights to 
maintain distinct associational structures.  In a related vein, 
indigenous peoples’ distinctiveness also serves as a basis for 
recognizing their rights to traditional lands and resources.177  
Certainly, indigenous peoples’ ability to own, occupy, control, and 
use their traditional lands and resources may protect the survival 
and flourishing of their  way of life.  However, indigenous peoples’ 
claims of distinctiveness in this vein also serve as a basis for 
independently recognizing indigenous peoples’ ability to own, 
occupy, control, and use their traditional lands and resources.  
 
174 See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text (recounting how indigenous 
peoples have utilitized human rights as a platform for their claims). 
175 See supra Part 3.3 (providing evidence of indigenous peoples’ participation 
in the creation of “hard” and “soft” law). 
176 See Anaya, supra note 77, at 29–38 (applying the universal right of self-
determination to indigenous peoples and noting that many states have “resisted 
an express association of the term ‘self-determination’ with indigenous peoples in 
standard-setting exercises in the U.N. and ILO”); Iorns, supra note 77, at 289, 306–
07 (analyzing the status of indigenous peoples according to positive international 
law and the implications of both the instrumental and inherent theories of self-
determination). 
177 See Anaya, supra note 69, at 240–43 (suggesting that human rights 
arguments and accounts of “illegitimate wresting of historical sovereignty” have 
ultimately “forge[d] an understanding that indigenous peoples have suffered, not 
just discrete episodic acts of neglect or even brutality by state actors, but also more 
systemic oppression as a result of state institutional arrangements that have been 
imposed on them and have failed to accommodate their cultural patterns”).   
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Because indigenous peoples have identified a distinctive 
communal, cultural, and spiritual relationship with the land they 
have occupied since time immemorial, they possess a human right 
to own, occupy, control, and use such land and its resources. 
Particularly in this latter vein, where indigenous peoples’ 
distinctiveness serves as a basis for the recognition of their human 
right to communally own, occupy, control, and use traditional 
lands and resources, grafting of the core normative precepts 
identified by indigenous peoples into human rights law is evident.  
A stark example of indigenous peoples’ strategic identification of 
core normative precepts and uploads of such precepts into 
international human rights law is present in the decisions 
emanating from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding indigenous 
peoples’ human right to property.178  These bodies have asserted 
that, when applied to indigenous peoples, both substantive and 
procedural aspects of the human right to property must be based 
on the recognition of indigenous peoples’ own land tenure 
systems. 
For example, in the case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights found that Nicaragua violated the rights of the Awas Tingni 
to use and enjoyment of their property under Article 21 of the 
American Convention by “grant[ing] concessions to third parties to 
utilize the property and resources located in an area which could 
correspond, fully or in part, to the lands which must be delimited, 
demarcated, and titled [as Awas Tingni lands].”179  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court recognized that the Awas Tingni’s rights to 
ownership, occupancy, use, and development of their ancestral 
lands and resources stemmed from the Awas Tingni’s own land 
tenure systems: 
[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must be 
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of 
their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their 
economic survival . . . . [R]elations to the land are not 
merely a matter of possession and production but a 
material and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, 
 
178 See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Judgment, 
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 153 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
179 Id. para. 153. 
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even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit to future 
generations.180 
Likewise, in the case of Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo 
District v. Belize, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
incorporated its earlier analyses and those of the Court regarding 
the distinctive core normative precepts associated with indigenous 
peoples’ land tenure systems: 
[I]ndigenous peoples enjoy a particular relationship with 
the lands and resources traditionally occupied and used by 
them, by which those lands and resources are considered to 
be owned and enjoyed by the indigenous community as a 
whole and according to which the use and enjoyment of the 
land and its resources are integral components of the 
physical and cultural survival of the indigenous 
communities and the effective realization of their human 
rights more broadly.181 
Furthermore, in the more recent case of Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights again 
acknowledged the core normative precepts that inform indigenous 
peoples’ land tenure systems: “Land is more than merely a source 
of subsistence for them; it is also a necessary source for the 
continuation of the life and cultural identity of the Saramaka 
people.  The lands and resources of the Saramaka people are part 
of their social, ancestral, and spiritual essence.”182 
Therefore, it is undeniable that the category “indigenous 
peoples” and its derivative human rights framework have been 
shaped by the transnational participation of communities of first 
peoples.  Indigenous peoples have strategically infused 
international human rights law with an alternative world-view.  
Multiple international bodies that address human rights generally 
have developed and addressed human rights norms specifically 
applicable to indigenous peoples.  These bodies include the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (previously Commission), the 
 
180 Id. para. 149. 
181 Maya Indigenous Communities of Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II/122, doc. 5, ¶ 114 
(2004) (footnotes omitted). 
182 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶64 (Nov. 
28, 2007) (footnotes omitted). 
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United Nations Human Rights Committee, the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the 
Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
These bodies have reaffirmed the individual and collective rights 
of the world’s indigenous peoples, and ultimately acknowledged 
the need to protect their way of life. 
4. IMPLICATIONS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ PARTICIPATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 
For the most part, analyses of non-state actor participation in 
international lawmaking focus on the implications of such 
participation with respect to the international legal regime.  
However, conceptualizing indigenous peoples’ participation in 
international lawmaking as participation by a traditionally 
marginalized community in identity building and rights formation 
broadens the scope of normative inquiry beyond what such 
participation does to, or for, international law to what such 
participation does to, or for, indigenous peoples.  Indigenous 
peoples’ participation not only prompts normative questions 
regarding the relationship between such participation and the 
constitution of international law, but also raises normative 
questions regarding the relationship between such participation 
and the continued advancement of indigenous peoples’ claims. 
4.1. Implications for International Law 
Indigenous peoples’ participation, like the participation of 
other non-state actors in international lawmaking, contests a state-
centered narrative and thereby raises normative questions 
regarding the proper formation and content of international law.  
Specifically, an acknowledgement of indigenous peoples’ 
participatory role in international lawmaking raises the following 
normative questions: (1) Who ought to participate in international 
lawmaking?  On what basis is indigenous peoples’ participation in 
international lawmaking processes justified?  (2) What normative 
precepts should be reflected in the content of international law?  
Should the core normative precepts strategically identified by 
indigenous peoples be incorporated in the formulation of 
international human rights as applicable to indigenous peoples? 
Indigenous peoples’ participation challenges the orthodox, 
state-centered narrative of international lawmaking.  It illustrates 
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how international norm-building and decision-making processes 
that shape the content of international law are not merely functions 
of state input and consent.  Indigenous peoples’ participation 
contributes a discrete piece to broader understandings of how 
international lawmaking occurs.  Indigenous peoples participate in 
international lawmaking by way of uploading local communal 
norms and values.  Such uploading takes place through 
participation in informal and formal human rights norm-
generating and decision-making processes.183 
An acknowledgement of indigenous peoples’ participatory role 
prompts normative questions regarding the proper formation and 
substantive content of what could bear the emblem of international 
law.  One justification for non-state actor participation in the 
formation of international law is that such participation may 
contribute to greater democratic global governance, which is often 
tied to notions of “good governance” and “legitimacy” in 
governance.184  Democratic global governance involves, in part, the 
decentralization of the state in norm and law creation, and thereby, 
a facilitation of input by non-state actors.185  In the context of 
human rights, principles of democratic global governance reflect 
an acknowledgment that the creation or modification of legal 
precepts that guide state behavior regarding the observance of 
human dignity should, at least in part, involve consideration of the 
views of those communities the principles are designed to impact.  
 
183 See supra notes 25, 38–40 and accompanying text (discussing the role of 
indigenous peoples in international lawmaking  and the concept of “bottom-up” 
lawmaking); see also Miranda, supra note 8, at 423 (proposing that “indigenous 
peoples have been successful in strategically identifying core normative precepts 
derived from their traditional land tenure systems and uploading such precepts at 
the international scale”). 
184 See Falk, supra note 61, at 250 (discussing the idea of global governance 
and, in part, the role of civil society in its achievement); Mertus, Transnational Civil 
Society, supra note 11, at 1351–53 (distinguishing the concept of “governance” from 
“government,” and discussing indicia of “good governance”). 
185 See GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE vii (1994) (“Good 
governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making 
(that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional 
ethos . . . and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving 
under the rule of law.”); see also STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Paper-
Wheatley.pdf (“The democratic deficit of global governance is not narrowed by 
electoral contestation for office and power, but by the application of the principles 
of inclusion, participation and accountability.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
MIRANDA.DOC 11/23/2010  3:57 PM 
254 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:1 
Furthermore, in such context, principles of democratic global 
governance also address problems associated with states that serve 
as proxies for the interests of elites, or more generally, problems 
associated with the power imbalance between states and sub-
national communities.  When viewed through this lens, the 
participation of indigenous peoples and the incorporation of their 
core normative precepts can be justified as a means of promoting 
democratic global governance.186  Essentially, indigenous peoples’ 
participation in international human rights lawmaking potentially 
increases the legitimacy of international human rights law and 
lawmaking processes.  Regardless of the debate surrounding the 
propriety or challenges of exercising democratic global 
governance,187 and regardless of other possible justificatory bases 
for allowing indigenous peoples’ participation in international 
lawmaking,188 indigenous peoples’ participation is likely to be 
perceived and analyzed, at least in part, as contributing some level 
of legitimacy to international human rights law and lawmaking 
processes.189 
 
186 Arguably, indigenous peoples’ core normative precepts could be taken 
into account in defining the content of customary international law.  See Ochoa, 
supra note 11, at 143–44 (noting that individuals are “increasingly demanding a 
voice in decisions that affect and determine their own value systems”). 
187 See Mertus, Transnational Civil Society, supra note 11, at 1384–86 (proposing 
that greater participation of voices increases democratic global governance, but 
that participation in and of itself may not reflect democratic principles of 
inclusivity, transparency, and accountability); Alvarez, Governing the World, supra 
note 11, at 607–10 (acknowledging the potential governance gaps engendered by 
inter-state organization participation). 
188 See Bluemel, supra note 13, at 57–58 (arguing that “improperly allowing 
participation may serve to negatively impact the regime as well as the localized 
ethnic group”).  Furthermore: 
[p]articipation should be highly context-dependent and cannot be based 
on a simple analysis of the functional needs of a regime, but must 
evaluate the ability of the group to meet those functional needs and other 
normative values held by the regime which might counsel civil society 
participation beyond the mere functional needs of the regime. 
Id. at 61. 
189 Arguments can be made, however, that indigenous peoples’ participation 
constitutes an illegitimate attempt at engaging the international system when 
efforts at the national level have proved unsuccessful.  In other words, indigenous 
peoples’ participation may be perceived and analyzed as an inappropriate 
“second bite” at the apple.  Furthermore, the incorporation of indigenous peoples’ 
core normative precepts into human rights law may be perceived and analyzed as 
leading to the inappropriate acknowledgment of “special rights.”  Nevertheless, 
given the continuously increasing status and rights of indigenous peoples’ under 
international law, it is unlikely that these and other similar arguments will bear 
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4.2. Implications for the Continued Advancement of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Claims 
The consequences of indigenous peoples’ participatory role in 
international lawmaking are overwhelmingly positive with respect 
to the continued advancement of indigenous peoples’ claims.  
While not a perfect process, indigenous peoples’ participation in 
international lawmaking has resulted in the reconstitution of 
human rights precepts when applied to indigenous peoples’ 
circumstances. 
It is difficult to suggest that such substantive reformulation of 
human rights precepts as applied to indigenous peoples is simply 
symbolic.  It is even more difficult to assert that the reformulation 
of these precepts is a diversion without any material impact—that 
the human rights discourse and its system of implementation and 
enforcement is incapable of producing any meaningful progressive 
social change.  Furthermore, it would be a stretch to pronounce 
that the reformulation of human rights precepts is simply a rehash 
of traditional liberal ideology with a new gloss that ultimately will 
continue to undermine the position of indigenous peoples. 
However, it is equally difficult to celebrate the phenomenon of 
a traditionally marginalized community’s participation in 
international lawmaking without a measure of pause.  The moment 
of pause is not so much a moment of paralyzing skepticism, but 
rather a moment of reflection regarding  the continuing challenges 
to  actualizing the full potential of such a phenomenon.  The 
infusion of an “indigenous peoples” category into international 
law and the uploading of indigenous peoples’ core normative 
precepts into international human rights law continue to be 
constrained by limits inherent in the discourse of human rights and 
by the structural limitations of the human rights framework.  There 
continues to be a gap between the participatory efforts of 
indigenous communities at the international level and the 
realization of their claims on-the-ground claims.190  This is not a 
critique of indigenous peoples’ decision to participate in 
international human rights lawmaking, but rather an assessment of 
how the human rights discourse and framework of  
 
significant traction.  See Cook and Sarkin, supra note 158, at 111–13 (exploring the 
debate of whether “indigenous rights represent ‘special privileges’”). 
190 See id. at 98 (proposing that “advances in rhetoric have not led to 
improvements in the ability of indigenous groups worldwide to benefit from the 
protections that international law supposedly affords them”). 
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implementation and enforcement may place some limits on the 
ability of indigenous peoples to reap on-the-ground benefits of 
such participation.191 
At this juncture, how can the human rights program serve to 
propel a more comprehensive operationalization of claims?  How 
can the success that has been achieved be capitalized upon for even 
greater long-term gains?  These questions are not meant to detract 
from the immense progress that has been made by, and on behalf 
of, indigenous peoples.  While indigenous peoples have reaped 
positive consequences from their participatory role in shaping the 
substantive contours of international human rights norms, it is 
nevertheless important to reflect on the possible challenges in the 
continued path toward progress. 
Certainly, the participation of indigenous peoples in 
international human rights lawmaking has had positive 
implications for the continued advancement and realization of 
indigenous peoples’ claims.  First, the creation of an indigenous 
identity and the translation of claims into human rights has 
normalized and provided moral bite to local activism and 
resistance from indigenous communities.  Second, the infusion of 
international law with an “indigenous peoples” category and 
indigenous peoples’ normative precepts has triggered the 
recognition of important rights, such as indigenous peoples’ right 
to self-determination192 and indigenous peoples’ rights to 
ownership, occupancy, control, and use of their traditional lands 
and resources.193  The recognition of such rights has enabled 
 
191 See David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 107–25 (2002) (identifying and addressing the  
potential “down sides” of the human rights project). 
192 See UNDRIP, supra note 65, arts. 3–4 (recognizing indigenous peoples’ 
rights to self-determination and self-government); see also Anaya, supra note 77, at 
29–30 (“[S]elf-determination is widely held to be a norm of general or customary 
international law, and arguably jus cogens (a peremptory norm).”). 
193 See UNDRIP, supra note 65, arts. 10, 25–29 (declaring that indigenous 
peoples may not be removed or relocated from their land without “free, prior and 
informed consent,” “just and fair compensation,” and preferably, “the option of 
return”); see also ANAYA, supra note 4, at 141–48 (discussing developments in 
international law—particularly the standards embraced by ILO Convention 169—
affecting the treatment of indigenous peoples’ rights to lands and resources); 
Anaya & Williams, supra note 38, at 41–48 (“[T]he existence of indigenous 
property regimes does not depend on prior identification by the state, but rather 
may be discerned by objective evidence that includes indigenous peoples’ own 
accounts of traditional land and resource tenure.”); Wiessner, supra note 38, at 109 
(concluding that indigenous peoples are, “in principle, entitled to demarcation, 
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indigenous peoples to seek recourse at the international level, 
which, at times, has resulted in the operationalization of claims.  
Third, at a minimum, indigenous peoples’ participation has 
created opportunities for conversation between indigenous peoples 
and state representatives regarding indigenous peoples’ claims. 
Nevertheless, indigenous peoples’ participation sheds light on 
the constraints within which indigenous peoples—and potentially 
other traditionally marginalized communities—operate for 
recognition of claims under international law.  As a means of 
analyzing the limits inherent in the discourse of international 
human rights and the structural limitations of the human rights 
framework, this part focuses on indigenous peoples’ claims to 
ownership, occupancy, use, and control of their ancestral lands and 
resources.  Discursive and structural limitations are more probable 
and problematic where the human rights discourse operates to 
allocate lands and resources. 
Indigenous peoples’ engagement in the discourse of human 
rights has resulted in the translation of indigenous peoples’ claims 
to ownership, occupancy, use, and control of their traditional lands 
and resources into particularized rights.  These particularized 
rights include: 
1) the right to legal recognition, demarcation, and titling of 
lands that indigenous peoples traditionally occupy; 2) the 
right to use, enjoyment, control, and development of such 
lands irrespective of formal title; 3) the right, at a minimum, 
to the use of natural resources associated with such lands; 
and 4) the right, at a minimum, to prior meaningful 
consultation when a state government seeks to engage in 
activities upon such lands or in activities that affect 
indigenous rights over such lands.194 
Indigenous peoples, through the processes described, have 
contributed to the identification and substance of these rights.  
These rights acknowledge the need to protect indigenous peoples’ 
distinct communal, spiritual, and cultural ties to their ancestral 
lands and resources.  They are reflected in multiple documents, 
including the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
 
ownership, development, control, and use of the lands which they have 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used”); Miranda, supra note 56, at 
148–50 (discussing the development of indigenous peoples’ land rights). 
194 Miranda, supra note 56, at 149–50 (footnotes omitted). 
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Peoples.195  Moreover, these rights are now arguably part of 
customary international law.196  Nevertheless, in the context of 
extractive industry projects, such as oil drilling or mining, these 
rights are often violated by collaborative ventures between states 
and transnational corporate actors.197 
Indeed, the human rights program has evolved to take into 
account indigenous peoples’ claims to their traditional lands and 
resources.  Human rights bodies emphasize indigenous peoples’ 
distinctiveness as a group as a reason for adapting human rights of 
general applicability to protect indigenous peoples’ ties to their 
lands and resources.  In effect, the discourse operates to allocate 
those lands and resources to indigenous communities vis-à-vis 
claims by states or non-state actors. 
Specifically, there are three primary discursive limitations to 
the continued advancement and realization of indigenous peoples’ 
claims.  First, the engagement of the human rights discourse has 
the potential of leading to an essentialized indigenous identity.  
Because the human rights discourse is not directly aimed at 
addressing the oppressive vestiges of colonization, indigenous 
peoples have had to formulate claims stemming from their status 
as colonized peoples into arguments for the recognition and 
protection of human rights.  Efforts to maximize the gains of 
human rights arguments that advance the claims of indigenous 
peoples as a whole have the potential of leading to the conflation of 
local realities and essentialization of local diversity.  Over the long 
term, such a result could hinder the operationalization of 
indigenous peoples’ claims to the extent that global advocacy 
efforts and platforms for the continued advancement of indigenous 
peoples’ claims fail to be reflective of, and accountable to, local 
diversity.  In other words, how can discursive gains continue to be 
helpful if, over time, real diversity among local communities fails 
to be reflected?  Ultimately, over the long term, continuing 
advocacy efforts should maximize the gains already made to 
account for diversity among local indigenous communities. 
 
195 See UNDRIP, supra note 65, arts. 10, 25–29 (referencing indigenous 
peoples’ rights to their traditional lands and resources). 
196 See Miranda, supra note 56, at 148–50.  
197 See id. at 154–60. 
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Second, the engagement of the human rights discourse may 
promote a fixed indigenous identity.198  Pursuant to the human 
rights discourse, indigenous peoples are not recognized as 
possessing attributes of inherent sovereignty pre-dating the 
modern nation-state, but rather, are recognized as deserving 
human rights protection because of their distinct religious, 
cultural, and political ways of life.199  This result raises the issue of 
whether it will be sufficient for indigenous peoples to continue to 
gain redress through human rights arguments that may be 
implicitly couched in fixed notions of religious, cultural, and 
political difference.  In other words, will indigenous peoples be 
perpetually called upon to perform a fixed identity in order to 
pursue contemporary claims?  For example, the continued 
realization of indigenous peoples’ contemporary claims to 
ownership, occupancy, use, and control of ancestral lands and 
resources may become problematic where an indigenous 
community seeks to benefit from commercial activities that may 
not be in line with conceptions of their religious and cultural ties to 
those lands.  Accordingly, in moving forward, particular attention 
should be devoted to how arguments that translate indigenous 
peoples’ contemporary claims into human rights can accommodate 
a more fluid conception of indigenous difference. 
Third, engagement of the human rights discourse may promote 
imagined or real struggles for a scarcity of resources among 
different identity groups in a given locality.200  Because pursuant to 
the human rights discourse, indigenous peoples are recognized as 
deserving human rights protection because of their distinct 
religious, cultural, and political way of life, indigenous peoples’ 
 
198 My argument is not that indigenous peoples actually have a fixed identity, 
or that indigenous peoples themselves should not be the ultimate decision-makers 
with respect to the development of their culture.  Rather, my argument is a 
critique regarding the potential of international human rights discourse to force 
indigenous communities into advocacy positions that require an emphasis on 
seemingly static and one-dimensional religious and cultural ties to ancestral 
lands. 
199 See RODRIGUEZ-PIÑERO, supra note 5, at 340 (suggesting that indigenous 
peoples’ cultural distinctiveness constitutes a source of indigenous peoples’ 
rights); see also ANAYA, supra note 4, at 141–42 (emphasizing that “property is a 
human right” and “the fundamental norm of nondiscrimination requires 
recognition of the forms of property that arise from the traditional or customary 
land tenure of indigenous peoples”). 
200 My argument is not that indigenous peoples are bearers of some kind of 
“special privilege.”  Rather, my argument critiques the potential of the human 
rights discourse to create an illusion of special privilege.  
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access or rights to land and surface or sub-surface resources are 
based on their distinct religious and cultural ties to land.  Because 
the human rights discourse is not equipped to answer the question 
of what constitutes a just allocation of scarce resources, the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ distinct rights to such resources 
creates an illusion of “special privilege” vis-à-vis other marginalized 
local groups (ethnic or racial minorities, the rural poor, refugees) 
that could ignite a struggle for such resources.  This result is 
merely an illusion of “special privilege” because the protections 
offered by the human rights discourse to indigenous peoples are in 
line with what non-marginalized communities consider a given—
security over lands and resources.  It raises the issue of whether it 
will be sufficient for indigenous peoples to continue to gain redress 
through human rights arguments that may seemingly pit 
indigenous peoples against other traditionally marginalized 
communities.  In other words, is this potential opposition simply 
an inevitable externality of producing a legal construction that 
functions within an already limited model of rights for 
traditionally marginalized communities?  How can indigenous 
peoples capitalize on the human rights discourse while perhaps 
leaving open opportunities for coalition building with other 
traditionally marginalized communities?  Therefore, in moving 
forward, particular attention should be paid to how advocacy 
efforts can address a potential illusion of special privilege.  
Indigenous advocacy efforts could engage other traditionally 
marginalized communities, and even states, in a dialogue about 
the just allocation of scarce resources, in ways that nevertheless 
account for indigenous peoples’ history, preservation of human 
dignity, and continued cultural survival. 
Furthermore, there are structural limitations to the continued 
advancement and realization of indigenous peoples’ claims.  First, 
indigenous peoples’ participatory role in international lawmaking 
within the human rights regime continues to take place within a 
fragmented lawmaking framework.  Even if contradictory, pre-
existing international norms could be reconciled with the 
contemporary indigenous rights framework, the international 
lawmaking machinery continues to operate within separate, often 
impermeable, boxes.  Accordingly, because indigenous peoples do 
not have significant access to participate in international 
lawmaking within what have been structured as independent 
spheres of international law, the on-the-ground impact of their 
international human rights lawmaking may be somewhat limited.  
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This broader contradiction within distinct realms of international 
law may continue to pose limits to indigenous peoples’ on-the-
ground progress. 
For example, in the context of extractive industry projects on 
indigenous lands, indigenous peoples’ human rights over their 
ancestral lands and resources often collide with pre-existing 
international law norms and other norms that continuously evolve 
under international trade and investment law.201  Indigenous 
peoples’ rights over ancestral lands and resources exist outside of, 
and  arguably in subordination to, other norms of international law 
such as state sovereignty over natural resources and states’ rights 
to development.  Moreover, corporate actors that benefit from 
state-granted concessions may be considered to have more rights 
over lands and resources than indigenous peoples that occupy 
such lands.  Accordingly, advocacy efforts should also take the 
form of greater participation in other international lawmaking 
forums, particularly those forums that include norm-generation 
and decision-making regarding matters tied to international 
economic transactions.202 
Second, while indigenous peoples’ lawmaking takes place at 
the international level, implementation and enforcement remains 
mediated through the state.  It may be more feasible for states to 
accede to indigenous peoples’ participatory role in international 
lawmaking than for states to implement and enforce the resulting 
legal principles, especially when such principles are at odds with 
the state’s other international obligations.  Although various non-
state actors may participate in international lawmaking, in 
different spheres and in contradictory ways, the state remains 
largely at the center of implementation and enforcement of 
international legal principles.  In the context of extractive industry 
projects, the state must reconcile its own interest in economic 
development, and sometimes even contradictory obligations to the 
corporate actor involved in the extractive industry project, with 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral lands and resources.  
As a consequence of states’ continued mediation of human rights 
implementation and enforcement, there is often a disconnect 
 
201 See notes 142–46 and accompanying text. 
202 For an example demonstrating that indigenous advocacy has already 
started to take shape, see Application for Leave to File a Non-Party Submission, 
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf. 
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between indigenous peoples’ participatory role in international 
human rights lawmaking and on-the-ground results. 
Third, as a pragmatic matter, the construction of indigenous 
identity and the production of knowledge regarding indigenous 
identity and rights have the potential of being managed by 
bureaucratic structures at the macro-level.  Some have argued that 
bureaucratic structures that not only control money and resources, 
but also the production of knowledge and the generation of 
ideologies need to be accountable.  How can these bureaucratic 
structures democratically control the means of knowledge 
production and contribute equally to diverse “indigenous” voices?  
Efforts to align indigenous peoples’ participation with principles of 
democratic governance that focus on questions of inclusivity 
within the group, transparency of group activity, and 
accountability of the group may ultimately facilitate the continued 
advancement of indigenous peoples’ claims. 
Thus, while capitalizing on the gains already made, continued 
advocacy efforts should reflect upon the potential discursive and 
structural challenges to engaging the human rights regime in the 
continued advancement of indigenous peoples’ contemporary 
claims. 
5. CONCLUSION 
While the resistance offered by the transnational movement of 
indigenous peoples need not be cabined exclusively within the 
discourse of human rights, the use of such discourse evidences an 
acceptance of the discourse’s limits in light of potentially valuable 
strategic gains.  Indeed, the recognition of an “indigenous peoples” 
category and of a derivative framework of indigenous peoples’ 
human rights offers a refreshing account of rights recognition for a 
traditionally marginalized community.  It is also a positive account 
of solidarity, intra-coalition building, and strategic prowess.  
Nevertheless, imperfect implications resulting from the limits 
inherent in the discourse of human rights and structural challenges 
of seeking on-the-ground gains through the human rights 
framework pose serious questions. 
Indeed, there is a potential dissonance between the benefits of 
indigenous peoples’ participation to the international law regime 
and the benefits of their participation to the continued 
advancement and realization of their claims.  Indigenous peoples’ 
participation may serve to lend greater legitimacy to international 
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human rights law and lawmaking processes but may not, in turn, 
consistently and effectively deliver the material gains that should 
follow.  This result is particularly problematic in the context of 
indigenous peoples’ participation because such participation is not 
focused on the creation of regulations, but rather on the 
formulation of rights that may ultimately serve to shift power 
structures in ways that alleviate conditions of subordination.  
Accordingly, the continued path to progress requires further 
reflection on how to alleviate such dissonance through meeting the 
outlined, and possibly additional, discursive and structural 
challenges. 
One possible path may involve the nature of advocacy that 
continues to shape international human rights law applicable to 
indigenous peoples.  To that end, as an initial matter, indigenous 
peoples’ advocacy efforts that engage the discourse of human 
rights may benefit from argumentation that recognizes the 
potential essentializing function of human rights discourse or the 
potential of such discourse to promote a fixed indigenous identity.  
Also, advocacy efforts that engage the discourse of human rights 
may also benefit from addressing broader normative questions 
regarding a just allocation of land and natural resources that 
impact other traditionally marginalized communities.  
Additionally, indigenous advocacy efforts should not only 
continue to focus on shaping the discourse of human rights, but 
should also address other discourses that intersect with, and at 
times may be at odds with, the discourse of human rights.  
Furthermore, indigenous peoples may turn their attention to 
playing an increasingly greater role in not only the processes of 
international lawmaking, but also in the processes of 
implementation and enforcement.  Moreover, as indigenous 
peoples continue to participate in the production of a body of 
international norms and practices regarding their contemporary 
status and rights, attention should also be given to maintaining 
structures that allow diverse indigenous “voices” to participate in 
such processes. 
While building on the gains already made through indigenous 
peoples’ participation in international lawmaking, identifying and 
working through these challenges is one further step in the 
continued path toward progress.  Ultimately, an account of 
indigenous peoples’ participation that reflects on these challenges 
perhaps holds some promise for the use of international human 
rights law as a meaningful tool of social transformation. 
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